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ABSTRACT
Keywords:

service-based
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The practice o f service-based manufacturing, utilized in various industries, especially in
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and automotive, is on a rise as it enables increased
enterprise effectiveness in dynamic contexts [1].
In such scenario, two different actors can often be distinguished: the End User (EU) and
the Manufacturing Service Provider (MSP). Depending on the nature o f the
manufacturing service supplied and the relative power o f the two parties, the MSP has to
consider various risk factors, which can potentially jeopardize its success with the
contract.
This thesis describes a risk assessment approach for the contractual relationship o f an
MSP and an EU, in the three most risky scenarios. The effects o f the risk factors on the
success o f the relationship are stochastically simulated and the simulation results are
analyzed. The developed framework can be utilized by the suppliers o f different
manufacturing services to help them with their risk assessment and management
activities.
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C

HAPTER
1 1ntroduction

1.1 General Overview
1.1.1 Service-based Manufacturing
Today’s markets in many industrial sectors have reached such an unprecedented high
degrees o f volatility, competitiveness, and globalization, that it has made many traditional
manufacturing paradigms and business models, such as vertical integration and mass
production, practically infeasible. Leasing manufacturing related services, including not
only manufacturing itself but also other services such as product design, process design,
research and development, after-sales services, and maintenance, is a quite new solution
which has proved to be successful in different market sectors, especially in electronics,
automotive and pharmaceuticals.
In general, two main actors can be identified in a service-based setting [14]:
• The End User (EU) who interacts with the market o f finished goods as a market
supplier. The EU’s core business is its interaction with the market itself. The EU often
adds its value to the product through innovation, design, marketing and branding.
• The Manufacturing Service Provider (MSP), who is made responsible for the
manufacturing response to the market and for customization. Its core business, then, is
manufacturing itself, which allows concentrating on the needed competencies and,
consequently, increasing effectiveness. The MSP has to acquire, operate and maintain

1
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the manufacturing facility [ 1].
The MSP may be known under various names, such as, for example, Contract Research
Organization (CRO), Contract Manufacturer (CM), Electronic Manufacturing Service
(EMS), Contract Design Manufactures (CDM), or Original Design Manufacturer (ODM),
among others, and have different functionalities[14]. In some cases, the MSP is even
handed over everything from design to fulfillment [18].
Leasing a manufacturing related service provides the EU with considerable savings and
cost reduction mainly as it requires no investment and capital tied in physical assets and
allows it to focus on its core competencies and improve its agility [1]. According to a
survey o f companies in U.S., U.K., and Continental Europe, top five reasons o f
outsourcing operations are:
• Achieving best practices,
• Access to new technologies and skills,
• Cost discipline and control,
• Improve service quality, and
• Focus on core competencies [20].
This probably justifies why many well-known companies, such as, for example, HP,
Microsoft, and Ericson [18], are among the extensive users o f manufacturing services.
The MSP, on the other hand, can enjoy better capacity utilization, expertise and
knowledge accumulation, economy o f scale and scope, and ability to smoothen demand
fluctuations across several clients [2], Thus, new generations o f companies which are
suppliers o f different manufacturing services have emerged in the last couple o f decades,

2
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such as, for example, Flextronics (electronics), Ideo (design), Delphi (automotive), and
Foxconn (electronics).
The inter-firm relationship o f the two actors is governed by a contract signed for a
defined time horizon [14]. Each actor typically has to manage a large number o f contracts
signed with different parties. This is especially important for the MSPs as they often have
to handle a large number o f contracts signed with different EUs each with different
requirements, power, and located in a different part o f the world.

1.1.2 Risk Assessment and Management
There is no doubt that risk management is an integral part o f every decision making
process as uncertainty is an integral part o f life. Uncertainty o f decision outcomes and the
decision making environment can lead to risk, the potential o f loss [7]. The categories o f
uncertainty (Table 1) provide a better understanding o f various uncertainties involved in
different projects.
To be more precise, risk can be defined as “a measure o f probability and severity o f
adverse effects” [15]. In other words, risk is “a concept that denotes a potential negative
impact to an asset or some characteristic o f value that may arise from some present
process or future event” [22].

3
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Table 1. Managerial categories for uncertainty [28]
Type o f Uncertainty

Definition

In time

Uncertainty about when certain events may occur or
the ability to react to them

In control

Inadequate authority to make or influence decisions or
inconsistency in processes

In information

Inadequate

or

inaccurate

information

on

which

decisions are based

“Risk Assessment” involves identifying sources o f potential harms, assessing the
likelihood o f their occurrence and consequences [22]. In fact, the main focus o f “Risk
Assessment” is finding answers to the following questions:
What can go wrong?
What is the likelihood that it would go wrong?
What are the consequences?[15]
“Risk Analysis” is any qualitative or quantitative method used for assessing the impacts
o f risks on decision situations [29], On the other hand, “Risk Management” involves
finding ways to mitigate these consequences through evaluating possible alternatives and
their associated trade-offs in terms o f all potential costs, benefits and risks [15]. Risk
management can be carried out through different activities, and the following are usually
considered as typical risk management activities:
Risk mitigation - risk reduction - preventative measures that can be implemented for
some risks to significantly reduce the probability o f the risk occurring.

4
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Risk mitigation - impact reduction - involves reducing the impacts o f the risks in case
preventing the risk from happening is not possible.
Contingency planning - plans for how to survive a problem. Contingency plans say what
is to be done after the risks are actualized. A particularly important form o f contingency
plan is a disaster recovery plan [30].
The practice o f “Total Risk Management (TRM)” covers both “Risk Assessment” and
“Risk Management” and addresses a set o f four sources for failure within a hierarchicalmulti-objective framework. These four sources o f failure are hardware failure, software
failure, organizational failure, and human failure [15].
One means o f managing risks is to characterize risky scenarios and identify the factors in
those scenarios. To analyze these scenarios, first, the contributing factors have to be
identified and quantified. Then, these risk factors can be arranged in different scenarios
and, by propagating their uncertainties, can be related to system outcomes [7].
In general, risk management models can be classified into two categories:
Classical models which involve statistical analysis. Examples o f classical models are
Monte Carlo simulation and influence diagrams, and
Conceptual models which incorporate fuzzy set analysis. An example o f conceptual
models is fuzzy sets [27].
Holistic Risk Management [9] is a rather new and more comprehensive process which
differs from conventional Risk Management in two ways:
It considers all the risks which threaten the objectives of an organization and not only
those which are ‘insurable’ or ‘fortuitous’.

5
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It considers minimizing risk and the impact o f risk as a main management function which
must be an integral part o f everyone’s job within an organization.
Holistic Risk Management takes into account risk such as, for example, risks threatening
an organization’s brand value, and public and trade reputation as well as the
organization’s intellectual property, legal rights and employees and risks associated with
the wide usage o f IT in today’s world such as computer crashes [9] which are inevitable
risk factors in today’s digital world.

1.2 Proposed Research
1.2.1 Motivations of the proposed research
Managing the life cycle o f the signed contracts is a high priority for any company and a
high percentage o f executive managers believe that their top pressure is to better assess
and mitigate external (supplier and customer) and internal risks [19]. A manufacturing
service contract is no exception and requires special attention to risk assessment and
mitigation activities to be managed effectively. In fact, outsourcing and utilizing servicebased manufacturing strategies are, in essence, adopted to manage risks o f investment,
technological changes and supply chain risks.
This is especially important for the MSP as it has to make extensive investments in
capacity and human resources and has to work with maximum efficiency to keep its
service attractive to the EUs and be profitable, at the same time. It has to do more than
simply reducing labor costs by moving production to low-wage areas, which incorporates
its own risks. The MSP has to take advantage o f technologies such as, for example,
reconfigurable manufacturing, leveraging the modularity (both hardware and software)

6
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and standardization [1]. Moreover, a single MSP has multiple contracts with multiple
clients each having different degrees o f relative power and requirements.
In order to be able to asses and mitigate risks associated with the supply o f manufacturing
related services, the MSP has to consider both its internal and external risk factors. A risk
assessment framework is required to help the MSP identify the risk factors, determine
their inter-relationships and asses their probability o f occurrence and negative impacts in
a standard systematic way.
Risk assessment and management literature related to this research is primarily focused
on software development and construction projects. While a fair amount o f the methods
and risk factors discussed in the literature ([10][9][7][11][15][17]) are also relevant to
MSPs, as the nature o f manufacturing services is different and unique, a new framework
for identifying and assessing the effects o f its associated risk factors is required.
Moreover, the characteristics o f the service supplier, or the software development team,
and its relative power and the service under contract, which give rise to certain risk
factors, are not considered in the literature.

1.2.2 Assumptions of the proposed research
This thesis is going to provide a general framework for the supplier o f manufacturing
services (MSP) to perform quantitative risk analysis through identifying, assessing, and
mathematically modeling the external risk factors associated with a supply contract
regarding supply o f a given manufacturing service for a given EU.
The proposed framework considers the attributes o f the contracted service and the
parties’ relative balance o f power as the root causes o f risk factors and follows a

7
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hierarchical holistic approach to evaluate the M SP’s chances o f success with a given
contract. Using Monte Carlo simulation, the developed stochastic mathematical model is
simulated and analyzed for numerical examples.
The conducted analysis can be used to devise risk intervention and mitigation plans as
part o f the risk management process. The outcomes o f the devised risk intervention and
mitigation plans can be also evaluated by adjusting the developed model using new
parameters for the simulated examples.
Note that, in our model, we only consider risks o f the contractual relationship o f the MSP
with the EU. MSP’s internal risk factors, which are present regardless o f its contractual
commitment to the EU, such as general managerial challenges or incorrect strategic
choices, are not taken into account.
Moreover, other external risk factors related to M SP’s suppliers or environment are not
considered. However, incorporating these risk factors in the model is quite straight
forward. Also, a stochastic mathematical model is only developed for the three riskiest
scenarios. Nevertheless, generalizing the model and using that for other scenarios is also
possible and straightforward.

1.2.3 Applications of the Proposed Model
The developed model can be o f great help to M SPs’ executives before and after bidding
or signing off contracts with their clients. It provides a far-sighted holistic tool which
helps identifying, modeling and assessing the impacts o f risk factors on the M SP’s
success with the contract and improves Contract Lifecycle Management (CLM) process.
Contract or risk managers can use the developed model to have a clear understanding o f

8
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their position, relative to their clients, and categorize the service they are committing to
deliver and the risk factors they are probably going to face. Such understanding will help
them make better choices about the type o f the contract, and be more proactive while
negotiating the terms o f the contract. Moreover, such framework model will make the
risk managers better able to evaluate and predict the efficiency o f their risk mitigation
and risk management plans.
In summary, the proposed model will help the managers o f manufacturing- service
suppliers efficiently perform risk assessment and analysis and, therefore, be able to be
more efficient at risk management.

9
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C

HAPTER
2 Review of literature

2.1 Service-based Manufacturing
Service-based manufacturing can be considered as an extension o f traditional
outsourcing. Outsourcing emerged as a popular operational strategy in the 1990s and
research on it started at about the same time. Since outsourcing IT/IS related activities is
now an almost standard practice for many companies [8], extensive research has been
conducted on different aspects o f outsourcing different IT/IS activities.
In 1998, Currie and Willcocks studied four types o f IT sourcing arrangements, total
outsourcing; multiple-supplier sourcing; joint venture/strategic alliance sourcing; and
insourcing. They specified the relationship between the scale o f IT market used and level
o f client/supplier interdependency, on one hand, and each type o f arrangement on the
other hand and described the risks associated with each resulting situation. They also
included case studies to show the importance o f contextualization o f IT sourcing
decisions by market, industry sector and managerial/technical skills [34].
In 2000, Plambeck and Taylor studied the effect o f outsourcing manufacturing to contract
manufacturers on profitability and investment in capacity and innovation. They showed
that even though contract manufacturing can increase profit through more efficient
capacity utilization, it may reduce profit by weakening the incentives for innovation.

10
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They concluded that contract manufacturing improves profitability for the industry as a
whole if and only if Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are in a strong
bargaining position vis-a-vis the Contract Manufacturer (CM). They proposed pooling
capacity between OEMs through supply contracts or a joint venture as a more desirable
alternative solution for week OEMS, although this may result in overinvestment in
innovation and capacity.
In 2005, Rohde studied the outsourcing practices o f very small through to medium-sized
manufacturing organizations. Her research revealed that while the decision to outsource
was similar across all firms, the manner in which functions were outsourced differed
depending on the size o f the firm [23], The results o f many o f such research efforts can
be generalized and extended to outsourcing other functions and services, including
manufacturing-related services.
A quite comprehensive literature survey on outsourcing was done by Jiang & Qureshi in
2005 along with suggestions regarding future opportunities in this area. They identified
three gaps in outsourcing research literature: little attention to outsourcing impacts on
firms’ performance and value, reliance on managers’ estimates in place o f tangible
metrics, and focus on cost savings rather than outsourcing decision’s ultimate benefits
(firms’ value) for company investors [21].
Also in 2005, Kakabadse & Kakabadse surveyed U.S., U.K., and Continental Europe
companies regarding current and future outsourcing trends in 2005. They concluded that
the existing trend o f effectively managing relationships with key trusted suppliers is the
main difference between current and future outsourcing trends and that the best-run
companies o f the future will focus more on establishing meaningfiil contractual

11
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relationships with a number o f key business partners. They identified studying the
relationship between the outsourcing results and the outsourcing contract as a promising
research area [20].
In 2006, Barthelemy & Quelin used Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the
Resource-Based View (RBV) o f the firm to study outsourcing agreements. They stressed
the critical nature o f the relationships between outsourcing clients and their vendors,
especially with regard to support activities and services that have direct connections with
manufacturing and the ‘core businesses’. They showed how some characteristics o f the
contract (e.g. penalties, incentives and monitoring) can offset any opportunism risks and
mitigate hazards.
The concept o f service-based supply o f manufacturing services was introduced by Urbani
et al, in 2002. They proposed manufacturing capacity supply as an extension o f
traditional outsourcing and an enabler for improved responsiveness and effectiveness.
They highlighted the drivers for this evolution in the manufacturing capacity supply and
studied the 8 feasible scenarios where the service provider becomes responsible for the
supply, operation and maintenance o f the manufacturing capacity needed by the
customer, for the time horizon o f the service along with real-life examples [1].
In 2007, Akbarzadeh & Pasek developed an analytical framework for analyzing the
behaviors o f the actors towards a manufacturing service supply contract. They classified
the possible contractual relationship cases into 6 categories based on the attributes o f the
service under contract and power structure. They analyzed the negotiation space and
equilibrium point in each case and concluded that the more balanced the power o f the
parties and the more standard the service contracted, the better the efficiency o f a service-

12
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based supply approach for the whole industry in long term [14].

2.2 Risk Assessment and Management
Risk assessment, management and analysis o f outsourced activities are quite extensively
studied in the literature, qualitatively or quantitatively, in many different fields, including
health care, environmental and safety engineering, and information technology. There is
also a fair amount o f research conducted on assessing and managing risks involved in
outsourcing different activities, especially IT related activities. Most o f such studies are
focused on the risk factors the end users and buyers o f outsourced activities have to take
into account and perform risk analysis from the buyers’ perspective. However, software
development and construction projects are exceptions since the software development
team’s and contractor’s risk factors are also widely studied and modeled in the literature
([7][9][10][11][14][27][26]).
In the field o f software development, a variety o f approaches have been used to
investigate Software Development Risk Factors (SDRFs). There are prioritized lists,
taxonomies, questionnaires and matrices, for assessing software development risks. There
exist SDRFs lists numbering to the orders o f 150 or more factors [10]. Houston et al
found twenty-nine o f these factors were cited most often in the literature and were more
important according to their survey respondents [7].
In the field o f construction, Mustafa & Al-bahar, in 1991, investigated the subject o f risk
assessment and developed a scheme o f classifying the various sources o f risk in
construction projects. They applied Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) in assessing the
riskiness o f a real-life constructing project [26].
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In 1998, Miles & Wilson explored risk management in the development o f a power
subsystem given the need to push the performance envelope. They described sources o f
project risk as complexity and novelty o f the development process and proposed a risk
space analysis tool for objectively identifying risk factors [17].
In 1999, Mulholland and Christian developed a schedule risk assessment process for
construction projects involving typical inputs and expected output to base on the past
experience. They defined five dimensions o f uncertainty in schedule o f construction
project and considered the variance o f the performance time distribution o f a project as a
measure schedule risk. The developed computer-based system in this paper provides a
structured approach for identifying the sources o f risk in a project and determining the
range o f schedule outcomes based on these risks [33].
In 2000, Sumner described the risk factors associated with enterprise-wide/ERP
(enterprise resource planning) projects and identified the risk factors in ERP projects
which are unique to these projects and grouped them into different categories. Also, she
organized these risk factors within the context o f the stages o f an ERP project and
assigned individuals responsible for managing risk factors at each phase and provided
strategies for controlling risk factors [25].
In a key paper published in 2001, Houston et al described an approach for modeling and
simulating the effect o f risk factors as a means o f supporting risk management activities
o f assessment, mitigation, intervention and contingency planning. They found the six
most important SDRFs through qualitative and quantitative surveys and studied their
effects. They then produced a base model for stochastically simulating the effects o f these
risk factors [7].

14
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Bryson and Sullivan, in 2003, explored ERP outsourcing in terms o f the application
service provider (ASP) approach, in which a third-party vendor hosts, manages and
maintains various data and ERP applications, and presented a framework to analyze
incentive schemes and design ERP outsourcing contracts for the mutual gain o f the
parties. This framework has three phases. The first two, outsourcer business analysis and
vendor business analysis, include identifying business objectives o f parties, identifying
risks, their impacts and possible risk resolution actions. The third phase, outsourcing
alternatives analysis, focuses on development o f effective outsourcing contract using
transaction cost theory and based on the outputs o f the first two phases [6].
In 2006, Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama stressed the importance o f managing the IS/IT
outsourcing vendors’ performance using incentive contracts and pointed out the fact that
to develop an outsourcing contract the IS manager must quantify risks and benefits. They
offer a method and some mathematical models for analyzing risks and constructing
incentive contracts for IS outsourcing [8].
Also in 2006, Suri & Soni studied the potential impact o f “low morale”- a risk factor, on
project outcomes, and proposed an approach to simulate Low Morale to analyze its effect
on certain software development risk management activities. Their simulator randomly
generates a Schedule Pressure level from empirical distribution and computes average
morale level and then Efficiency level based on that[ 10].
Table 2 summarizes the key papers and their associated limitations which this thesis
attempts to complement and contribute to.
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Table 2. Key papers summary
Paper

No

Limitations

Method

• Deterministic model
Mustafa & Al-bahar
AHP

1

• Too specific (to a certain construction

(1991)

project)
• Too specific (to certain power plant
project)
• Focuses only on novelty and
Miles & Wilson

Risk space

complexity as sources o f risk

2
(1998)

analysis

• Does not precisely define customer/
stakeholder satisfaction considered as
outcomes

PERT,

• Focuses only on construction projects

information

• Only considers schedule risks

Mulholland &
technology o f

3
Christian (1999)

HyperCard
and Excel
• Focuses only on software
development projects
Stochastic
4

Houston et al (2001)

• Does not consider project and

simulation,

arrangement properties

surveys

• Is only concerned about project time
and budget (not holistic and far
sighted)
• Only considers and models “Low
morale” and its effect on efficiency

Stochastic
5

Suri & Soni (2006)

level
simulation
• Focuses only on software
development projects
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• Does not consider project and
arrangement properties
Mathematical
analysis o f
Akbarzadeh & Pasek

• Does not specifically focus on the

negotiation

risks

6
(2007)

• Only considers the bottom-line

space and
equilibrium
point

As shown in the table, there is a gap in the risk assessment literature with regard to
considering risks threatening an enterprises image and contractual relationship with its
clients. In other words, almost all similar papers in the literature do not have a holistic
approach and only focus on risks jeopardizing the project time and budget. Moreover,
almost all the papers listed in the table, except number 6 and to some extent number 2,
are either too general or too specific to a certain project.
This thesis attempts to address these limitations and gaps in the current literature and
provide a framework which takes into account the context o f performing risk assessment
with a far-sighted holistic point o f view.
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C

HAPTER
3 Design and
methodology

3.1 Scenarios Studied
Considering the balance o f power and the attributes o f the manufacturing service under
contract, six possible extreme scenarios can be considered [14]. Figure 1 shows the
sources o f different types o f power [13] whose weighted sum determines parties’ relative
power. The negative signs indicate an adverse relationship.

Coercive Power
Reputation
^

Reward Power

Size [4'
Competition ( uniqueness)[2]
Referent Power
Economic position
ixpertise Power
market power [11]
'Persuasion Power<;
General Expertise/
Experience

’lant ownership [13]

^Legitimate Power^
^^Information Power

Relative power

Figure 1. Different types o f power and their sources
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The relative balance o f power is influenced by the following factors:
• Previous relationship [2]
• Trust
• Loyalty
• Continuation probability[3]
• Parties culture
• Organizational Culture
• Industry
• Geographic region
• Regulated environment
On the other hand, the service under contract can be a commodity service or a specific
and unique service. Factors defining specificity are illustrated in Figure 2.

Specificity

Time-sensitivity

Complexity/size

Asset-specificity

(-) Life cycle

HZJ_____

m i . r i 3 i ____

position__

Figure 2. Definition o f specificity

The six possible combinations o f these two factors, i.e. service attributes and the balance
o f power, can be considered as six scenarios as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Advantage
B alance of Pow er

Figure 3. Different possible scenarios

Mathematical analysis performed in [14] shows the amount o f hypothetical risk involved
in each scenario. According to that, the riskiest scenarios are Scenario C, Scenario A, and
Scenario F. The least risky scenarios, on the other hand, are Scenario E, Scenario B, and
Scenario D (Figure 4). Thus, we focus on the riskiest scenarios and apply the given
framework to them to assess the probability o f failure for each, and then compare the
results.
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Hypothetical risk

Figure 4. Hypothecial riskiness o f scenarios

3.2 Cost Breakdown Structure
To calculate the costs the MSP incurs we basically use the cost structure described in
[14]. The MSP rents its service to the EU for a defined period o f time, t , and a leasing
price, L. M SP’s net present value (NPV) can be formulated as [14]:

X ( L - C mP\ e » d t

if C msp < L

NPVtMSP= <

(1)
_J |(L - CMSP)| • (e pt - 2)dt

where

C m sp

Otherwise

is M SP’s total costs o f delivering the service,

p

is the opportunity cost o f

\ —e~p
money for the MSP, B = --------- , and t is the time horizon o f the contract. To

Normalize, we consider o f the M SP’s cost items as their percentage o f L, and let L=100,
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and t = 1. Thus, we will have the percentage o f net present value as:
r
5(100- C W )
npvm

C

m sp

< 100

spJ

1(5 -

where,

if C

(2 )
2 ) ( C ' m sp -

100)

Otherwise

m sp

Using this formula the losses will be magnified in the same way the profits are reduced as
a result o f lost opportunities and considering opportunity costs.
Considering the implications o f Transactions Costs Economy (TCE),

C m sp

can be broken

down as follows:
• Production costs (Cprod)
>

Investment (machinery, human resources, processes, peripheral)

>

Operational costs
o

Adjustment costs (in response to changes in volume or product
specifications) [24]

• Transaction costs (CT)
> Ex ante (deterministic/fixed)
Bidding, negotiation, legal, and contracting costs, and other charges that might be
incurred to set up the relationship [8],
>

Ex post (stochastic)

Reporting, communication, transition [8], renegotiation, conflict resolution,
penalties, law suits, publicity, marketing, and adaptation costs.
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• Opportunity costs (p) [14]
We assume that the ex ante transaction costs, Cex_ante, have been already incurred and are
inputs to our model, and that opportunity costs, p, are also given and remain constant
during the contract’s time horizon. These three main categories o f costs are going to be
considered in the model and the costs resulting from the actualization o f risk factors are
added to appropriate cost categories in a linear manner.

3.3 Probability o f Failure
The objective o f the model is to study the probability o f failure o f the contract. Thus, we
first need to define success or failure. Here, failure is defined as the occurrence o f one or
more than o f the following fatal risk factors, defined in terms o f binary variables:
•

Financial loss (FLo)

(3)
Otherwise

•

Incomplete contract (7Q
' 1

if Pic>PIC
Pb

(4)

\C=<
Otherwise

•

Loss o f partner (LoP)
fl

if P lo p > P LoP

(5)

LoP=]
0

Otherwise
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•

Loss o f image/reputation (Lol)
'1

if P l o i >

P LoI

LoI=“

(6)

.0

Otherwise

Failure o f the contract can be defined as the weighted sum of the above random variables:
P Failure= FLO* WFLo + IC* WIC+ LoP* WloP + Lol* WloI

(7)

where, WFLo+ WIC+ WLoP+ WLoi= 1, and, therefore, 0< P F a u u r e < L
Note that considering the linear cost accumulation formula and the definition o f Financial
Loss and Failure, convert the continuous total costs, and therefore NPV, to discrete step
wise probabilities o f financial loss and failure. In other words, first, costs are accumulated
and the NPV is calculated using equation (2). Then, if the obtained NPV is less than a
pre-defined threshold, FLo will be equal to 1, which will, in turn, lead to an increase in

PFailure b y W FLo-

3.4 General Methodology and Model Description
The generic risk assessment process utilized in [7] is going to be used as a roadmap. This
process is composed o f the following stages:
1. Identifying the risk factors. This stage involves analyzing the power structure
and the attributes o f th e service u n d er contract to identify th e m o st im portant risk

factors which can potentially lead to the failure o f the contract.
2. Modeling the system to incorporate the risk factors. In this stage, the inter-

24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

relationships between the risk factors are described and modeled.
3. Quantifying risk factor uncertainties. Here, random variables are defined to
quantify the uncertainties associated with each risk factor. Afterwards, the a
distribution function is assigned to each defined random variables using various
methods, such as, for example, fitting distributions to historical data or using the
opinions o f experts.
4. Propagating the uncertainties. At this stage the model is exercised to output the
probability o f failure.
5. Sensitivity analysis. Having the probability o f failure resulting from previous
stages, the model can be used to find alternatives which help decreasing the
probability o f failure.
Each step is going to be completely customized to incorporate the unique requirements
and characteristics o f the manufacturing related services.

3.5 Proposed Methodology
To model the contractual relationship o f the MSP and the EU, who is leasing the
manufacturing services for a defined time horizon, a hierarchy o f risk factors is
developed using a mixture o f bottom-up and top-down methods. Figure 5 illustrates the
way risk factors are organized in a three-level hierarchy. The hierarchy illustrated in this
figure is the output o f the risk identification process and is used as the input o f risk
quantification and modeling process.
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Define contract’s success/failure
Level-3 Risk Factors
Qualify

More
critical

Level-2 Risk Factors
Qualify

Root
causes

Level-1 Risk Factors

Service Attributes

Power Structure

Figure 5. Risk Factors Structure

Such hierarchy, in which each level qualifies the next level, if it

passes

a defined

threshold, makes devising risk mitigation, and management plans

easier and more

efficient since it considers the root cause o f each risk factor. Moreover, each Level-2 and
Level-3 risk factor can be traced back to one or more Level-1 risk factor. Thus, if the root
cause Level-1 risk factors o f each higher level risk factor are controllable, the higher
level risk factor can be also managed and controlled through managing and controlling its
root cause.
T he generic process described in the previous chapter is custom ized as follow s.

3.5.1 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the system
As mentioned before, in this stage the three-level hierarchy o f risk factors is constructed
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using a mixed method, i.e. a combination o f top-down and bottom-up methods. This
means that, first, starting from the top, Level-3 risk factors are identified, then, from the
bottom, the first level o f the structure is built, and, finally, by connecting these two levels,
the second level o f the structure is constructed.
The steps followed in this stage are as follows:
Step 1_ Identifying and Modeling Level-3 risk factors
1. Considering the objective function and the definition o f failure, provided in the
previous chapter, list Level-3 risk factors. From our definition these fatal risk
factors are as follows:
• Financial loss
• Loss o f image/reputation
•

Loss o f partner

•

Incomplete contract

2. Find the cause-and-effect relationships between the identified risk factors.

Step 2_ Identifying and Modeling Level-1 risk factors
1. List the attributes o f the service under contract and the direction o f the power.
2. Consider the attributes listed in sub-step 1, brainstorm their possible implications
and effects, and list the most important relevant risk factors, in terms o f both the
probability o f occurrence and the severity o f the potential outcomes, resulting
from each attribute. These risk factors form the fist level o f risk factors o f the
model.
3. Find the cause-and-effect relationships between the identified risk factors.
4. List the impacts o f each Level-1 risk factor.
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Step 3_ Identifying and Modeling Level-2 risk factors
1. Consider Level-1 and Level-3 risk factors and find out how the Level-3 risk
factors can be resulting from the Level-1 ones, considering the impacts o f Level-1
risk factors found in step 2. List the most important risk factors resulting from the
actualization o f Level-1 risk factors which can potentially lead to Level-3 risk
factors, considering their potential impacts. These risk factors form the Level-2
risk factors o f the model.
2. Find the cause-and-effect relationships between the identified risk factors.
Figure 6 illustrates the process o f identifying the risk factors and modeling the system. To
identify the risk factors, their impacts, and their interrelationships, risk factor lists
mentioned in the literature (for example in ([7][8][9][10][11][15][14])), brainstorming
sessions, Delphi method, or experts’ opinions can be used as guidelines, depending on
their availability.

Form T,eve1-3 Risk Factors

Identify Level-1 Risk Factors using
service attributes and power structure

Connect Level-1 and Level-3 Risk
Factors by defining Level-2 Risk

Figure 6. Identifying and Modeling Risk Factors Process
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3.5.2 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
1. Start from the Level-1 risk factors and move in a bottom-up manner to higher
levels. Define quantified measures for each risk factor in terms o f random
variables using their impacts, similar to what is done for the fatal risk factors in
defining the objective function. Note that one risk factor can be translated into
more than one random variable.
2. Consider the cause-and-effects relationships between the risk factors and translate
these relationships into qualification relationships between the random variables
defined in the previous sub-step. Also, consider that co-movements o f variables in
the same direction and in the opposite direction i.e. situations when a high value
o f one variable means a high or low value for another variable, and quantify these
co-movements by setting up a correlation matrix.
3. Assign a probability distribution function to each random variable associated with
each risk factor, along with the correlations between each two correlated random
variable.
4. For each qualification relationship, define a threshold, whose violation activates
the dependent risk factor(s), using either brainstorming or available data.

To quantify the risk factors, various methods including analysis o f historical data,
brainstorming, surveys, and questioners can be used. Also, some risk factors already
modeled in the literature (especially in [7] and [11]) can be reused.
To model correlated variables, since different variable follow different distributions, the
so called “distribution-free” approach or Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients
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should be used (For more information on this approach refer to Appendix A).
Before describing the simulation method used in this thesis, a brief overview o f Monte
Carlo simulation approach is presented.

3.5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
In general, “Monte Carlo methods” are used to solve problems which are too complex to
solve analytically (e.g. do not have closed-form solutions) through generating suitable
random numbers and observing that fraction o f the numbers obeying some property or
properties [22]. Monte Carlo simulation is a widely used tool in many fields, including
classical risk management models utilized to simulate the behavior o f the system
considering uncertainties o f risk factors.
Monte Carlo simulation is a method for iteratively evaluating a model using sets o f
random numbers as inputs. It is useful for analyzing uncertainty propagation, where the
goal is to determine how random variation, lack o f knowledge, or errors affect the
modeled system. Monte Carlo simulation is a sampling method because the inputs are
randomly generated from probability distributions to simulate the sampling from an
actual population. Figure 7 shows a schematic view o f Monte Carlo simulation [31], note
thaty(v) is a function o f vector x=(x/, x?, x.?).
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Figure 7. The Base o f Monte Carlo Simulation [31]

Monte Carlo Simulation is useful method for risk assessment and management because it
helps studying the behavior of the system given the uncertainties o f risk factors. It allows
for studying the outcomes (success or failure) o f the system in the event o f various
possible values o f random variables associated with risk factors. Thus, a Monte Carlo
Simulation method is proposed to propagate the uncertainties o f risk factors identified,
modeled and quantified in the previous steps o f the proposed methodology.

3.5.4 Propagating Uncertainties Using a Multi-stage Monte Carlo Method
Using the proposed multi-stage Monte Carlo simulation technique, stochastically
simulate the model using the random variables o f the first level o f risk factors as the
inputs, and the Level-3 risk factors, and the failure probability, as the outputs o f the
simulations model. Figure 8 summarizes the simulation process.
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Monte Carlo Simulator
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Level-1 risk factors
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Qualified Level-2 risk factors
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Monte Carlo Simulator

Accumulated

Level-2 risk factors samples
1
Qualified Level-3 risk factors

\

/

Monte Carlo Simulator

XX
Probability o f Failure
Figure 8. Proposed Monte Carlo simulation Method

To specify the required number of simulations the jack-knife technique can be used. Jackknife technique works as follows: start with an arbitrary number o f simulations, N, and
run the simulation twice to get two answers. Compare the answers; and if the difference
between the two results is more than a predefined limit, e, double the simulations to 2*N.
Keep doubling the number o f simulations until the error is smaller than e [15].
It should be pointed out that using Monte Carlo Simulation implies that the proposed
framework model falls in the category o f classical risk management models.
T o im plem ent the sim ulation m odel, w e utilize @ R isk, w hich is a M icrosoft E xcel add

on used for performing risk analysis using Monte Carlo simulation [29].
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3.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The objective o f this stage is to identify the most significant root causes o f failure,
evaluate their impacts, and check if they can be controlled, and if yes, assess the impact
o f controlling them on the probability o f failure. This means that in this stage, the main
attempt is to find the Level-1 risk factors which contribute the most to failure o f the
contractual relationship.
To do this we perform regression sensitivity analysis using tornado graphs and analyze
the results. To perform regression sensitivity analysis, a multiple linear regression1, based
on the results o f simulation runs, is done using the selected outputs (e.g. Probability o f
failure) as the dependent variable and the values o f random variables, defined to quantify
risk factors, as the independent variables. The standardized regression coefficients (or
beta) o f independent variables are, then, graphed in decreasing order in a tornado
diagram.
The beta coefficient o f an independent variable shows the number o f standard deviations
by which the independent variable increases by one standard deviation, having fixed all
other independent variables. The bigger the absolute value o f a beta coefficient, the most
influential the associated random variable.

1 Regression is a term for fitting data to a theoretical equation. In the case of linear regression, the
input data is fit to a line. Multiple regression tries to fit multiple input data sets to a planar equation
that could produce the output data set. [29]. In other words, The objective of multiple linear
regression analysis is to find the best b coefficients to be model the relationship between an
independent variable, Y, and n independent variables, xh i=0,..,n, as follows:

Y= bo+biXi+b2X2+...+bnxn+e
where bo is the intercept ("constant" term), Z>,s are the respective parameters of independent
variables, and e is the involved error.
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The R-squared value can be used as a measurement o f the percentage o f variation
explained by the linear relationship. If R-squared is less than ~ 60%, the relationship
between the inputs and outputs can not assume to be linear.
Hence, using the generated tornado graph, it is possible to visually identify the most
significant random variable in terms o f their impact on the selected output. Since each
random variable is associated with a certain risk factor, this means that the most
influential risk factors can be also identified. Furthermore, from previous stages, it is
known which Level-1 risk factor(s) are the root cause(s) o f each Level-2 and 3 risk
factors. Thus, tornado graphs resulting from regression sensitivity analysis can be used to
help identifying the main root causes o f failure (as the main output o f the simulation
model) and evaluating their severity.
In summary, this stage can be summarized as follows:
1. Find out the most influential random variables using regression sensitivity
analysis.
2. Trace back these most influential variables to their root cause Level-1 risk factors.
3. Check if each o f the identified most influential Level-1 risk factors are
controllable.
4. Examine the effect o f controlling controllable Level-1 risk factors.

As mentioned before, due to the structure o f the risk factors, where each risk factor can
be tracked back to a Level-1 risk factor, uncontrollable higher level risk factors rooted in
controllable lower level ones can be managed and mitigated through controlling the root
cause Level-1 risk factor(s).
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Here, we model the three riskiest possible scenarios, analyze and compare the results.
Such comprehensive sensitivity analysis can be very useful in defining risk mitigation
and intervention plans for companies; once they realize in which category their
contractual buyer-supplier relationship falls.
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c

HAPTER
4 Applying the Proposed
Methodology to Scenarios

4.1 Scenario C
4.1.1 Description
As mentioned before, Scenario C is the riskiest scenario as it involves supplying a
specific service for an EU which is in superior position power wise. Start-up companies
providing innovative services will most likely fall into this category.

In scenario C, according to the definition o f specificity, the service under contract is a
complex, novel service which involves a high degree o f asset specificity, for both
physical and human resources related assets. Also, as a result o f the market conditions or
the nature o f the service, it has to be delivered to the EU, and to the market, in a short
time, or otherwise its value will depreciate significantly over time.

Note that as in this scenario the balance o f power is in favor o f the EU, all managerial
categories o f uncertainties, i.e. uncertainty in time, in information, and in control[7], have
to be considered. This means that the risk factors associated with this scenario have
higher likelihood and severity and are less controllable.

In 2003, when Flextronics was trying to market its Phone 4 phones to major cell phone
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market players, who would brand, market and distribute the product, its situation can fall
under this scenario. Flextronics, who has long worked as only a contract manufacturer o f
cellphones designed by OEMs, was now offering a new and rather complex product,
especially in terms o f intellectual property rights, to the same OEMs who had a wellestablished position in the market and were therefore in a better bargaining position. This
marketing effort proved to be risky in reality as the customers (OEMs) were trying to
impose difficult terms and conditions on Flextronics and the company had to spend a
very long time finding interested customers and negotiating contracts [31].

4.1.2 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the System
This section describes how the risk factors associated with this scenario are identified,
and are modeled using the methodology described in Chapter 3.

Step 1_ Level-3 risk factors
Already completed in 3.5.1.
Step 2_ Level-1 risk factors
The risk factors directly resulting from the attributes o f the contracted manufacturing
service, which form the main part o f the first level o f our hierarchy, are represented in
Figure 9 (The risk factors are put in boxes). The influence diagram in Figure 9 represents
the cause-and-effect relationships between these risk factors2.

2 Regarding notation arrows indicate cause-and-effect relationships and a - sign indicates adverse
relationship, i.e. the effect decreases as the cause increases and vice versa. Also, a “leads to”
relationship means that the cause risk factor can potentially result in the effect risk factor.
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Moreover, as the balance o f power is in favor o f the EU, it will probably behave
opportunistically to maximize its own profit. Thus, “EU’s Opportunistic Behavior” is the
most important risk factor resulting form EU’s superior power.

Technical problems

Lack of qualified personnel

High production costs
Excessive schedule pressure

Level-1 risk factors
Service attributes

High novelty

High time-sensitivity

High asset specificity
Large size/high complexity
Leads to

----- ►

Level-1 risk factor

Figure 9. Level-1 risk factors rooted in nature o f contracted service in Scenario C

The identified Level-1 risk factors are inter-related and their relationships are shown in
Figure 10. These relationships indicate that the random variables defined to model these
risk factors will be correlated.

^ Technical problems are in fact a group of risk factors which can be considered as a whole, these risk
factors include:
•

Inadequate technology

•

Little or no task programmability ( knowledge of the process) [11]

•

Technical/configuration errors
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Technical problems

High production costs

Excessive schedule pressure

Lack o f qualified personnel

Leads to ------►
Level-1 rsik factor

Figure 10. Interrelationships between Level-1 risk factors resulting from the nature o f the
contracted service

Figure 11 illustrates the risk factors resulting from EU’s superior power.

Low productivity

Excessive schedule pressure

Creeping requirements

Level-1 risk factors
Power Structure

Financial pressure

EU’s opportunistic behavior
Leads to
EU’s superior power

Level-1 rsik factor

Figure 11. Level-1 o f risk factors resulting from EU’s superior power in Scenario C

The impacts o f Level-1 risk factors are listed in Table 3. Studying the potential impacts
o f Level-1 risk factors helps with identifying Level-2 risk factors.
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Table 3. Impacts o f Level-1 risk factors
Effects

Risk Factor

• Lost time to find and hire qualified personnel
Lack o f qualified personnel [7]

• Training, hiring, and adapting costs
• Continuing with under qualified personnel
• Technical/configuration errors

Technical problems

• Defects
• Cost o f defects/errors
• Time to fix defects/errors
• Excessive effort to meet deadlines which

Excessive schedule pressure[7]

may lead to low moral and attritional
losses[7]
• Costs o f overtime, incentives, etc

Low Productivity[7]
Low commitment
EU ’s opportunistic behavior

More time and effort, inferior results (in terms
o f meeting requirements4)
Low productivity
Time and cost pressure, creeping requirements
[71, overdependence on the EU

Lack o f qualified personnel [7] and lack o f experience is a result o f the fact that the
service is new and in the early stages o f its life cycle. This causes costs o f hiring, training
and adapting employees, and triggers the risk o f loosing time before the human resources
obtain the required degree o f expertise. Lack o f sufficient experience and expertise also
■r
bears technical risks and the time lost in searching for qualified people and training may
lead to excessive schedule pressure and delays.

T echnical problem s can lead to technical/configuration errors and defects in the product.

4 The term requirement is used in its broad sense and includes all functional, non-functional,
quality, time and budget requirements of the EU, as specified in the contract
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These errors or defects take some time to be fixed and can lead to excessive schedule
pressure. They can also cause costs o f rework and/or wastes.

Excessive schedule pressure is also an important risk factor, especially because o f the
time-sensitive nature of the manufacturing service contracted. Excessive schedule
pressure incorporates tight deadlines, and forces the personnel to put more effort than
average to meet the deadlines. This can result in exhaustion and low morale[7] and,
therefore, low productivity o f the personnel. Moreover, excessive schedule pressure can
increase the likelihood o f making errors and technical problems.

High production costs actually means that as a result o f inaccurate cost estimation,
significant unexpected additional costs, or any other reason, the production costs are
much higher over initial estimates at the time o f bidding and negotiating the contract.

On the other hand, as the EU is in a better position than the MSP and has more relative
power, it may pressure the EU for doing more in less time and for substantially lower
prices. In fact, the agreed price imposed by the contract may be far too low and the time
line may be unrealistically short in the first place, and the EU might be able to exert even
more pressure the MSP.

Step 3_ Level-2 risk factors

The first level o f risk factors, if actualized, give rise to the second level o f risk factors,
which are more fatal and can directly cause the MSP to fail. For simplicity, this step is
illustrated using three figures (Level-2 risk factors are in bold boxes). Figure 12
illustrates Level-2 risk factors resulting from the actualization o f risk factors associated
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with the service under contract.

Law suits

jM issm ^^quirem en^

Cost overrun

Level-2 risk factors
Level-lrisk factors

Excessive schedule pressure

High production costs

Technical risk factors

Lack of qualified personnel

leads to
Level-1 risk factor |
Level-2 risk factor □

Figure 12. Level-2 risk factors rooted in service attributes in Scenario C

Figure 13 shows Level-2 risk factors resulting from the fact that the balance o f power is
in favor o f the EU, and, therefore, it may behave opportunistically.

Controversial relationship
Cost overrun

M issing requirements I

Lawsuits

Level-2 risk factors
Level-lrisk factors

Creeping requirements
Excessive schedule pressure

Financial pressure

Low productivity

leads to
Level-1 risk factor |
Level-2 risk factor □

Figure 13. Level-2 risk factors rooted in power structure in Scenario C
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|

|

Figure 14 represents the relationship between Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors and how
realization o f Level-2 risk factors can cause the MSP to fail with respect to its contractual
relationship with the EU. (Rounded bold boxes indicate Level-3 risk factors and some o f
the repetitive relationships are omitted).

floss of image/reputation.

incomplete contract
loss of partner

Level-3 risk factors
Level-2 risk factors
Law suits

Cost overrun

Missing requirements
COTitov^yjrdatiM^dpJ
leads to ---- ►
Level-2 risk factor □
Level-3 risk factor

o

Figure 14. Level-2 and Level-3 Risk factors in Scenario C

Table 4 summarizes the negative effects o f Level-2 risk factor which can potentially lead
to Level-3 risk factors.
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Table 4. The impacts o f Level-2 risk factors in Scenario C
Effects

Risk Factor
Missing requirements
Cost overrun

• A percentage o f agreed requirements will not be met
• Renegotiation costs, penalties
No/little margins gained in the job

Controversial

• Large number o f sever conflicts

relationship

• Conflict resolution costs

Law suits

• Bad publicity
• Publicity, court costs and penalties

4.1.3 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
Model General Notations

• Initial values or thresholds are specified with hats, for example CPRindicates the lower
bound o f the Cpr, costs o f doing PR.

• P indicates the probability o f its subscript, for example PFaiiure indicates the probability
o f the failure (of the contract).

• All total costs are indicated with letter C and their nature is indicated in the subscript.
For example, CPR indicates costs o f PR (public relations). Note that all costs are in
terms o f percentage o f total costs.

• All times are indicated with letter T and their nature is indicated in the subscript. For
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example, Ttechindicates time wasted for fixing technical problems/errors5.

• All random distribution functions are represented by f

• D indicates degree, for example D controversy indicates degree o f controversy in the
relationship.

Also, whenever a 1 to 7 scale is used, the numbers indicate qualitative values as follows:

1

Very Low

2

Low

3

Fairly low

4

Average

5

Fairly high

6

High

7

Very high

A 1 to 4 scale, whenever used, covers the last four o f the above degrees, as follows:
1

Average

2

Fairly high

3

High

4

Very high

Level-1 risk factors

In this section, we explain the way Level-1 risk factors are quantified. Considering the
impacts and implications o f each risk factor a number o f random variables are defined to

5 We have considered a normal distribution for the T variables which is consistent with the project
management and scheduling practices and literature (e.g. [33]).
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quantify each risk factor. Also, an example distribution is considered for each random
variable to be used in the example simulation run.

• Lack o f qualified personnel[7]
• Total percentage o f lost time (

T p erSonnei ~

1 to 7 scale)

• Total percentage o f additional costs o f personnel hiring, training,...( C p erSonnei ~
f t CPersonnel) f
• Continuation with under qualified personnel ( Punderquaiified)

fT
Punderqualified

if

and

OR

CpersonneP* CPersonnel

'= 1

(8)
f^underqaalified

Tpersonnei

'Tpersonnei> 4

C p ersonnei

Otherwise

are strongly correlated. In the simulated example, we consider the

following distributions:
•

Tpersonnei

~ Binomial (3, 0.5, shift (+1))

• CPersonnel ~ N(5, 2)
•

**

7

C p ersonnef= 5 , P unlierqualified

• Technical problems
• Total % cost o f error s/defects

( C tech ~

• Total % time to fix errors/defects

f (

( T tech

C tech))

~ f ( T tech))

These two random variables are strongly correlated and have positive correlation with
continuation with under qualified personnel and negative correlation with productivity

6 This is in addition to ordinary labour costs which are considered as part of the production costs
^

TPersonnel ~~

M {CPersonnel)^"

®

(C Personnel)
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level. In the simulated example, we consider the following distributions:

•

C tec h

~ N (8, 5)

• Ttech ~ Binomial (6, 0.5, shift (+1))

• Excessive schedule pressure [7]
• Degree o f schedule pressure (

D sched u ie)

~1 to 7 scale (where higher degrees have

higher probabilities)
• Total % cost to make up schedule pressure

( C scheduie ~ / (

C scheduie) )

These two random variables are positively correlated; D scheduie is also positively correlated
with

T tech

and

T pers0nnei• In

the example we consider:

• p {D s c h e d u ie = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7})=( {0.05,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.23,0.22,0.2})
•

C Schedule

~ N(5, 2.5)

• Low Productivity[7]
• Degree o f productivity (Dproductivity)- 1 to 7 scale
Dproductivity has strong negative correlation with degree o f schedule pressure, percentage o f
added requirements and is negatively correlated with
consider that

D p ro d u c tiv ity

D p i/o p p o rtu n is m

• In the example we

follows a binomial (6, 0.5) distribution, shifted one unit to the

right. Figure 15 represents the Binomial (6, 0.5, shift (+1)) distribution’s graph. It is clear
from the graph that the closer the degree to average, the more the probability. In fact, the
graph can be approximated by a normal distribution which is traditionally considered to
model natural phenomena.
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B inom ial(6,0.5) Shift=+1
0.35V

0.25--

a-io--

0.00

2.000

6.000

Figure 15. Binomial (6, 0.5, shift(+l)) distribution

• EU’s opportunistic behavior
• Degree o f EU ’s opportunism ( D Euopportumsm)~ 1 to 7 scale
Note that as EU has superior power, the probabilities o f higher degrees o f opportunism
are considered to be greater. Dsckeduie is positively correlated with Dopportunism since the EU
can pressure the MSP to complete what is committed to do in shorter time.

In the example, P ( p Euopportmism ={1,2,3,4,5,6,7}) = ({0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.22,0.2,0.18})
• Creeping requirements
• Costs o f extra requirements (CxRq~ f (CxRq)) (is added to production costs)
CXRq is strongly correlated w ith M R q , and D EUopportunism.
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In the numerical example, / (CXRq) is assumed to follow Exponential (20) distribution
[7]8.
• Financial pressure
• The imposed price cut on the MSP (L~), defined as a percentage o f original L,
leasing price stated in the original contract, which follows a f(L ) distribution.
f(L ) is considered to be N(10, 5) in the example.
Table 5 summarizes how the effects o f Level-1 risk factors and the relationships between
Level-land Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated.

8 Houston et al found out that the percentage of additional work to do as a result of requirements
creep follows an exponential distribution [7]. Assuming a linear relationship between these
additional work and their associated costs, we can assume an exponential distribution for costs of
extra requirements as well.
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Table 5. Relationships between Level-1 and Level-2 risk factors
Level-1 risk factor

Level-2 risk factor formulation
• C p ersonnei

is

added to

production

costs

(HR

investment)

Lack o f qualified personnel[7]

• Qualifies MRq if P u n d erq u a lified ~ l
•
Technical problems

C tec h

is added to production costs

• Qualifies MRq if C tech>
(In the example
•

Excessive schedule pressure

C scheduie

is

C tech = 20

added

C tech

OR

T te c h >

4.

9).

to

production

costs

(HR

investment)

Low productivity

• Qualifies MRq if D scheduie > 4
Qualifies PIRq if D productivity 4

EU’s opportunistic behavior

Qualifies

XRq,

R^EVovvortunisrK>

MRq,

D controversy

and

L

if

4

Level-2 risk factors
In this section we describe the way Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated.
• Missing requirements
• % o f requirements missed {MRq ~ / (MRq))
• Costs o f missing requirements {CMRq ~ / (CMRq )) (added to ex post transaction
costs)
These two random variables are strongly correlated with each other, D opportmism, DSCf,eduie
and XRq.
• Cost overrun
Already defined.

^ C eCH M (C{ech)

O (Ctech)
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• Controversial relationship
• Degree o f controversy (Dcontroversy)~ 1 to 4 scale
• Cost o f conflicts (added to ex post transaction costs)
f (Cconflict)

if

D controversy^*®
( 9)

C c o n flic t-

v0

Otherwise

These 2 random variables are strongly correlated and positively correlated with
D'EUopportunism

• Law suits
• Additional court costs (Ciawsuits) (added to ex post transaction costs)
~

f (C iaw suits)

if Dcontroversy 4 Or MRq

>

MRq\

(10)

Clawsuits

0

Otherwise

Clawsuit is strongly correlated with MRq.
In the simulated example, we consider the following distributions:
• M Rq- N(30, 20)
• Cmrct N(15, 8)
•

D controversy~

binomial(3,0.5), shifted one unit to right

• Ciawsuits ~ N(70, 20 )

The second level o f risk factors can directly lead to failure o f the contract. The stochastic
relationships between the second level risk factors and the fatal risk factors, whose
occurrence mean the failure o f the contract, are summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6 . Qualification Relationships o f Level-2 risk factors
Qualification Relationships

Level-2 risk factor

IF MRq >MRq2 11 THEN qualifies

Missing requirements

Cost overrun

•

Controversial relationship (Dcontroversy)

•

Incomplete contract ( P ^ Rq = 1)

•

Loss o f partner ( Pp0Rq = 1)

•

Loss o f image ( P ^ fq = 1)

Already defined
IF Dcontroversy >=3 THEN qualifies
• Incomplete contract ( p ^ niroversy= [)

Controversial relationship

•

Loss o f partner( P ^ roversy=1)

•

Loss o f image (P ^ “

^ = l)

IF occur at all {Ciawsuits >0) THEN qualifies:
Law suits

•

Incomplete contract ( pj£wSuUs = 1 )

•

Loss o f image ( P “

•

Loss o f partner ( = 1 )

'te =1)

The weighted sum o f the probability o f each Level-3 risk factor caused by each Level-2
one defines the probability o f its occurrence, as follows:
r>
LawSuits & ryLawSuits _±_ ,, controversy * ry controversy _i_ „.M R q sk ryMRq
lic
= w, ,c
* Prc
+ wIC
*FIC
+ wIC * PIC

lop ■p
*L or~

* jy LawSuits ,
Controversy & ryControversy , „, M R q * jyM Rq
w LawSuits
,op
* p LoP + w L
oP
* r !oP
+ w,oP * f !oP
LawSuits % -pLawSuits
W Lo}
r Lo}

.
1"

Controversy
W lo I

^

pC ontroversy
Lol

,

MRq % p M R q
Lol
L ol

10 All P variables in this table are equal to 0 if not qualified.

11 MRq\>MRq2
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/I 1 \
(11)
/■*

(12)
/i
V1

Even though “Incomplete contract” leads to “Loss o f partner” and “Loss o f image” as the
root causes o f all these Level-3 risk factors are the same Level-2 risk factors, their
interrelationship is already modeled. In other words, occurrence o f “Incomplete contract”
means that a law suit has happened, and/or the percentage o f missing requirements or the
degree o f controversy is greater than a limit which is also the precondition for “Loss o f
partner” or “Loss o f Image”. Thus, if the contract is incomplete, the probability o f losing
the partner or the company’s reputation is automatically higher.

In the simulated example, we consider the following values for the model:
£=$0; PK. - PLoF=PLoI =0.5;
0.2;

w ^ meny= 0.1;

MRql=70;

M Rq2=3012;

< £ ?= 0 .5 ;

w“

=0.4; w“

te= 0.5;

w“ ""'overs>’=0.3;

s =0.4;

wcL°0f roversy =0.1;

< ? = 0 .5 .

4.1.4 Propagating the Uncertainties
Figure 16 shows the schematic presentation o f the simulation model.

12 MRq\ = n (MRq)+ 2o (MRq), M Rql = (i (MRq)
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Level-1

Personnel

Monte

*

S

Personnel

A

underqualified

Carlo

Me

tech
tech

samples
Prod

Level-2
Monte
controversy

Carlo
samples
Level-3
M onte

Carlo

Lol

LoP

J C

samples

Cost item
Correlation
Qualification

^

^
-----

Figure 16. Schematic view o f the simulation model

Figure 17 shows the cost breakdown structure o f each cost category, without considering
opportunity costs. All the cost items under Total
the original

C pnxi

and

C ex.ante■ Total

Cprod and

Total

C ex.ante

are in addition to

costs ( C m sp ) are subtracted from (100 -L~) and are

applied to equation (2) to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) o f delivering the
manufacturing service for the MSP.
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MSE
ex-ante
MRq

lawsuits.
ex-nost

■XRq

nrod

Figure 17. Cost breakdown structure

Considering WFLo=0.15; if/c=0.25; WIjOp=0A\ WLor 0 .2 , p=$0.5 [11], e =0.005, and that
production costs (Cprod) follows N (50, 20) distribution, the following results were
obtained after running 40,000 simulations.

Note that as in Scenario C the MSP is offering a novel complex service to a more
powerful and reputable EU, the weight o f Financial Loss is considered less than the
weight o f Loss o f Partner and Loss o f Image. This is consistent with what is seen in real
world when start-up companies even accept some monetary loss to build relationship
with promising customers and to establish a good reputation in the market.

Table 7 represents the results o f simulating the developed model for Scenario C, plugging
in sample distributions.
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Table 7. Simulation results for Scenario C numerical example

8.199

72.526

M a x im u m
O u tp u ts
190.088

Total C ex-post 0.033

35.894

190.173

10.569

5%

117.394

95%

14.599

120.072

371.825

63.435

5%

225.161

95%

-329.741
0

-27.660
0.599

-151.874

0
0
0

0
0

5%
5%
5%
5%
5%

28.768
1
1
1
1

95%
95%
95%
95%
95%

0

0.323
0.132
0.323
0.317

67.206
1
1
1
1
1

0

5%

1

95%

C prod

0.058

40.057

In p u ts
106.042

15.592

C ex-post

0.002

10.040

26.148

3.685

N am e
Total C prod

C MSP
% NPV
FLo
LoP
1C
Lol
F a ilu r e
P r o b a b ility

"^Personnel
Cpersonnei
p
1 underqualified
Ctech
Ttech
^schedule

M ean

M in im u m

x1

p1

I

x2

| p2

37.251

5%

119.634

95%

0
0

5% 64.784
5% 16.571

95%
95%

1

5

7

2

5%

7

0

5.049

13.282

1.808

5%

8.315

95%

0

0.036

1

0

5%

0

95%

0

8.597

32.717

1.651

5%

16.350

95%

1

5

7

1

5%

7

95%

1

5

7

1

5%

7

95%

95%

0

5.116

16.113

1.344

5%

9.119

95%

1

4

7

2

5%

6

95%

1

5

7

2

5%

7

95%

0

11.140
22.956

30.769
99.829

3.582
1.785

5%

0

18.858
63.535

95%
95%

MRq

0

33.431

119.572

6.397

CMRq

15.746

47.488

3.853

5%
5%

64.066

0

28.430

95%
95%

12.383

81.728

147.260

50.785

5%

112.492

95%

1

3

4

1

5%

4

95%

Cscheduie
^productivity
CEUopportunism

LCxRq

Ciawsuits
Ccontrov ersy

5%
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4.1.5 Analysis and Conclusions
As shown in the table, the probability o f failure is very high and is approximately 32
percent. Moreover, the probability o f financial loss is also very high and, on average,
there is a 60% chance that the contract results in negative NPV, especially because the
EU might be able to impose price cuts o f up to 30% o f the original price.

Table 8 provides interesting information about the number and percentage o f times
Level-2 risk factors are qualified which, in turn, can provide useful information on the
root causes o f these risk factors. For instance, the statistics show that only in 4% o f the
simulation runs there has been no missing requirements.

Table 8. Level-2 risk factors qualification statistics
No o f
V a ria b le

% of

tim e s n o t tim e s n o t
q u a lifie d q u a lifie d

Eunderqualified

26348

65.87

L-

16116

40.29

CxRq

16116

40.29

MRq

1806

4.515

C|VIRq

1806

4.515

34705

86.7625

8948

22.37

^lawsuits
^controversy

According to the regression sensitivity analysis performed to identify the most influential
risk factors on Financial Loss, Figure 18, EU’s opportunistic behavior, which is a Level-1
risk factor and is the root cause o f several other risk factors, is the most dangerous risk
factor, followed by high production costs, represented by Cpr0d, and costs o f missing and
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creeping requirements, CMRq and CXRq, respectively.

DEUopportunism

Total

C prod

CMRq

CxRq

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Std b Coefficients
Figure 18. Regression Sensitivity analysis for Financial Loss

On the other hand, since on average 33% o f the original and creeping requirements o f the
EU, mostly in terms o f time and budget, are not met, and the degree o f controversy is
most probably “high”, the mean o f Dcontroversy-3, on the defined 1-4 scale, the chances o f
losing the EU and not being able to establish a good reputation, referring to the success o f
such contract, are also relatively high.
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0.54

controversy
MRq

0.435

0.186

EUopportunism

0.074

0.035

’MRq

0.027

-0.023

productivity
-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Std b Coefficients

Figure 19. Regression Sensitivity analysis for probability o f failure

According to Figure 19 and considering the fact that controversial relationship is partially
a result o f missing requirements, it can be concluded that “Missing Requirements” is the
most influential risk factor that can cause the contract to fail. However, since “Missing
Requirements” is a Level-2 risk factor, “EU’s opportunistic behavior” and “High
production costs” are the main root causes o f failure.

As the only controllable Level-1 risk factor whose controlling can potentially save the
contract is “high production costs”. Assuming that production costs are substantially kept
low, through for example taking full advantage o f modularity, standardization and
reusability [1] or moving the production to low-wage areas, according to Figure 19 and
Table 9, and the definition o f Std b, each 25.11 units decrease in Total Cprod can result in
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0.026 (0.074*0.355) decrease in probability o f failure. This small decrease indicates the
fact that not only Scenario C is the riskiest scenario but also its corresponding risk factors
are mostly uncontrollable.

Table 9. Summary statistics for probability o f failure and production costs o f Scenario C
S ta tis tic

Minimum
Maximum
Mean

V a lu e fo r
F a ilu re
P ro b a b ility

V a lu e
fo r

. PfiTOd

0

8.198

1

190.088

0.316

72.526

S td D ev

0.355

25.112

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode

0.126

630.619

0.800

0.774

2.055

3.887

0.150

69.350

0

43.104
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4.2 Scenario A
4.2.1 Description
Scenario A is the second riskiest scenario. In this scenario, similar to Scenario C, the
MSP provides the EU with a specific service, which means that service under contract is
a complex, novel service which involves a high degree o f asset specificity, for both
physical and human resources related assets. However, opposite to Scenario C, in this
scenario the MSP has superior power compared to the EU.

Since the balance o f power is in favor o f the MSP in this scenario, the managerial
categories o f uncertainties which are hypothetically more significant are uncertainty in
time, and in information [7] and uncertainty in control is probably less significant. This
means that the risk factors associated with this scenario probably more controllable.

EADS (Airbus S.A.S.) contracts with many airlines for delivering A380 "supeijumbos"
can be put in this category, especially considering the fact that EADS’ only competitor
Boeing had no comparable plane to offer the airlines which gave EADS more bargaining
power. Manufacturing and delivering the largest passenger airliner in the world has been
an unprecedented and complex project which has been subject to series o f delays, weight
problems (missing requirements), and $1.9bn o f over budget (high production costs and
cost overrun) which, in turn, has lead to customers’ withdrawals (incomplete contracts)
and has hurt to Airbus image (loss o f image) [22] [32].

Some researchers believe that as the past vertically integrated companies lose their
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manufacturing and other expertise and their ownership o f the facilities and process over
time, the balance o f power more and more shifts to the MSPs. This has been the case in,
for example, electronics where according to a report, as a result o f the emergence o f a
small number o f large CMs, “bargaining power has shifted to tier-one contract
manufacturers”. These researchers believe that this power structure is also very risky for
the industry as a whole in terms o f profitability [3].

4.2.2 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the system
Step 1_ Level-3 risk factors
Already completed in 3.5.1.

Step 2_ Level-1 risk factors
Since in Scenario A, similar to Scenario C, the service under contract is a specific
service, all risk factors resulted from the attributes o f the service which were modeled for
Scenario C are applicable here as well.

On the other hand, the fact that the MSP has superior power relative to the EU, can lead
to two other significant first level risk factors. The first one is M SP’s opportunistic
behavior, which can be reflected in M SP’s pressurizing the EU for more money and/or
time, not being responsive enough, lower quality than agreed on in contract, shirking, etc.
The other risk factor resulted from the M SP’s superior power, according to our definition,
is that M SP’s management, and consequently staff, do not really care about the contract
and show low levels o f commitment to its success, as shown in Figure 20.
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Excessive schedule pressure

Low productivity

MSP’s opportunistic behavior

Low management committment

Power Structure

MSP’s superior power
Leads to ------►
Level-1 rsik factor

Figure 20. Level-1 risk factors resulted from M P’s superior power in Scenario A

Along with the impacts listed in Table 3, listing the impacts o f risk factors resulted from
the specificity o f the service under contract; the impacts o f M SP’s opportunistic behavior
and low commitment are listed in Table 10.

Table 10. Impacts o f M SP’s opportunistic behavior and low commitment
Risk Factor

Effects
Low

M SP’s opportunistic behavior

responsiveness,

not

meeting

EU ’s

requirements, and shirking which will ultimately
leave the EU unsatisfied.

Low commitment

Shirking, Low productivity, low responsiveness

Step 3_ Level-2 risk factors
Level-1 risk factors, if actualized, may give rise to Level-2 risk factors, which are more
fatal and can directly cause the MSP to fail. Along with Figure 12, which shows Level-2
risk factors resulted from service attributes,
Figure 21 represents Level-2 risk factors resulted from the actualization o f M SP’s
opportunistic behavior and low commitment. Again, repetitive relationships which are
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already shown are omitted from these influence diagrams.

Law suits
Conteov^sid*teiadon^^^
Cost overrun 1

[ELrTbankn^
1
Level-2risk factors

\
MSP’s opportunistic behavior
leads to
Level-1 risk factor |
Level-2 risk factor n

Figure 21. Level-2 risk factors rooted in M SP’s opportunistic behavior and low
commitment

^ sso fp a r tn e r /lr u sty *

(incom plete contract*^

►^oss^ofimage/reputation^

(FinanciaUoss^
Level-3 risk factors
Level-2 risk factors
Cost overrun

Missing requirements
Controversial relationship
Law suits

I EU’s bankruptcy/financial hardship

leads to -----►
Level-2 risk factor □
Level-3 risk factor
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o

|

Figure 22 represents the relationship between Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors and how
realization o f Level-2 risk factors can cause the MSP to fail with respect to its contractual
relationship with the EU.

fioss of partner /trustV*----- (incomplete contract )

»{joss of image/reputation J

Financial loss I
Level-3 nsk factors
Level-2 nsk factors

Cost overrun

Missing requirements
jjCon^v^ialrclationship
iN e^tiv ^ n ed ia

|ElTsbantaip^^^^^^^^^^rj

leads to -----►
Level-2 risk factor □
Level-3 risk factor

o

Figure 22. Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors o f Scenario A

Table 11 summarizes the negative effects o f Level-2 risk factor which can potentially
lead to Level-3 risk factors.
Table 11. The impacts o f Level-2 risk factors in Scenario A
Effects

Risk Factor
Missing requirements
Cost overrun
Controversial relationship
EU’s bankruptcy or

• A percentage o f agreed requirements will not be met
• Renegotiation costs, penalties
No/little margins gained in the job
• Large number o f sever conflicts
• Conflict resolution costs
EU will not be able to continue business with MSP

financial hardship
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Negative media coverage/
word o f mouth

• Negative comments about the company in the media
(within the industry or mass media)
• Additional publicity, marketing costs
• Bad publicity

Law suits

• Publicity, court costs and penalties

4.2.3 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
Level-1 risk factors
In this section, similar to what was done for Scenario C, we explain how Level-1 risk
factors are quantified. Since the risk factors resulting from the specificity o f the
manufacturing service under contract are similar to Scenario C, they are not described in
this section to avoid redundancy. However, considering the fact that in Scenario A, unlike
Scenario C, the MSP has superior power, the values assigned to the model parameters in
the numerical example are considered different, as follows13:
*

^underqualijied

* CP ersonnel

0 .2

~ Noimal(4, 2),

C P erson n el- ^

• Ctech ~ Normal (6, 4), Ctech=6
• p {D s c h e d u ie =
® Cschedule

{l,2,3,4,5,6,7})-( {0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.25,0.2,0.15})

~ NOTOial(3, 2)
f l (Dproductivity)

D productivity

commitment'

(14)

s

Otherwise

’J 2 (D 'productivity)

13 Note that as in this scenario, the MSP has more power than the EU, the agreed leasing price, L, is
considered to be greater, which results in smaller values for mean percentages of costs, compared to
Scenarios C and F. Also, this superior power will potentially result in less tolerance for costs and
therefore, smaller values for upper bounds.

66

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

D'productivity has strong negative correlation with degree o f schedule pressure. In the
example, we c o n s i d e r (Dproductivity) as a Binomial (6, 0.5, shift(l)) distribution and f j
(D p ro d u ctivity)

as

a

discrete

distribution

where

? { D p ro ductivity=

{1,2,3,4,5,6,7})=

(0.15,0.15,0.25,0.2,0.1,0.1,0.05}).

• Low commitment
• Degree o f commitment ( D commitm en t)~ 1 to 7 scale
In the example, P(Dcommitoe„r={l,2,3,4,5,6,7}) = {0.18,0.2,0.22,0.15,0.1,0.1,0.05})

• M SP’s opportunistic behavior
• Degree o f opportunism (.Duspopponmisn)- 1 to 7 scale

In the example, P ( D MsPopPortmism ={1,2,3,4,5,6,7} = {0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.22,0.2,0.18})
Note that as MSP has superior power, the probabilities o f higher degrees o f opportunism
and lower degrees o f commitment are considered to be greater.

D scheduie

is negatively

correlated with D 0pp0rtunism since the MSP can relatively easier get extensions from the
EU. Also, the MSP can take advantage o f its superior power to make the EU pay an extra
amount o f money added to the original L (denoted by L+ which follow a f(L +) distribution
which is considered to be N orm al(8,4) in the example).
Table 12 summarizes how Level-1 risk factors resulting from M SP’s opportunistic
behavior and Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated. Since M SP’s low
com m itm ent leads to low productivity and does n o t directly to resu lt in any L evel-2 risk

factor, the table only contains M SP’s opportunistic behaviour.
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Table 12. Relationships between MSP’s opportunistic behavior and Level-2 risk factors
in Scenario A
Level-2 risk factor formulation

Level-1 risk factor
M SP’s opportunistic behavior

Qualifies L+ and other associated Level-2 risk
factors (except law suits) if DMsPomortunism> 4

Level-2 risk factors

In this section, we describe the way Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated.
Again, the risk factors already modeled for Scenario C are omitted and only the two
Level-2 risk factors unique to Scenario A are described.

• EU’s bankruptcy or financial hardship
• Degree o f EU’s financial difficulty (.DEUHardship)- 1 to 4 scale
D E U H a d r s h ip

is positively correlated with D

o p p o r tm ism

and L

+.

• Negative media coverage/word o f mouth
• Degree o f negative coverage (D-coverage)- 1 to 4 scale
• Additional publicity costs (added to ex post transaction costs)
' f(CA?)
Cpr-

if D-coverage^Q
(15)

"

Otherwise

The 2 random variables are strongly correlated with each other, Dopportunism, MRq and
D c o n tr o v e r s y

In the simulated example, we consider the following distributions:
• MRq~ Normal(40, 20), MRql =80, MRq2 =40, MRq3 =30
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• CMRq~ Normal(10, 5)
•

D c o n tro v e rs y ^ B i n

01T lic ll (3 .0.5,

s h 1f t (

1))

• DEuHardship ~ Binomial(3,0.5, shift(l))
• Ciawsuits ~ N orm al(50,2 0 )
• L+ ~ Normal(8, 4)
• Cpr ~ Nonnal(20, 8)
• D -coverage ~ Binomial(3,0.5, shift(l))

The second level o f risk factors can directly lead to failure o f the contract. The stochastic
relationships between the second level risk factors and the fatal risk factors, whose
occurrence mean the failure o f the contract, are summarized in Table 13.

69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

Table 13 . Qualification Relationships o f Level-2 risk factors.
Relationship with Level-3 risk factors

Second level risk factor

IF MRq >MRq3 THEN qualifies

Missing requirements

•

Incomplete contract ( Pj£Rq = 1)

•

Loss o f partner ( Pp0Rq =1)

IF MRq >MRq2 15 THEN qualifies
•
Cost overrun

Loss o f image ( P ^ fq = 1)

Already defined
IF Dcontroversy ^ '3 THEN qualifies
• Incomplete contract ( p^°ntrmmy= 1)

Controversial relationship

•

Loss o f partner (

)

•

Loss o f image ( / ^ 7 'rovm> = l)

IF DEUHardship >=2 THEN qualifies
. Loss o f partner (p ^ d s in p y = J)
EU’s bankruptcy or financial
hardship

•

Incomplete Contract( p ^ UHardshiP==i)

IF DEUHardship >=3 THEN qualifies
. Loss o f image ( p ^ h m p = \ )
IF D.coverage >4 THEN qualifies loss o f image

Negative media coverage

/ p -c o v e r a g e _i
\ r LoI

\

l)

IF occur at all {Ciawsuits >0) THEN qualifies:

Law suits

•
•

Negative media coverage
Incomplete contract ( p ^ wSuUs = \ )

.

Loss o f image ( P “

•

Loss o f partner ( p ^ ’Suits = l )

ft= l)

'4 All P variables are equal to 0 if not qualified.

15 MRql > MRq2 > MRq3
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The probabilities of Level-3 risk factors can be obtained using the following weighted
sums:
T,

_

LawSuits

Pic - wrc

P ,L oP
D

_

* r%LawSuits . * controversy * jycontroversy _i_ *,MRq * jvM Rq
* r IC
+ w IC
* r IC
+ w lc * f IC

LawSuits
- W LoP

*•LawSuits

rio r- wLoI

*

*

i

n LawSuits
!XjP

rtLawSuits

* r LoI

.

* Controversy
LoP

*

j'E U D ifjicu lty

*

+ wLoI '

r>Controversy

i

*.MRq
LoP

.

~ Controversy

LoP

nEU D ifficulty

r LoI

£

(16)

ryMRq
^L oP

+ wLoi

*

(17)
nC ontroversy

] l0i

.

^

yt.M Rq
w Loi

*

ryM Rq

?ua

/i q\

In the simulated example, we consider the following values for the model:

Controversy

p

EUHardship
Lol

LawSuits

EUHardship
?LoP

controversy

,.LawSuits

Controversy

-cov erage ...q ^
*

Lo l

4.2.4 Propagating the Uncertainties
Considering WFLo=0.35;

W jc = 0 A 5 ;

Wl0f= 0.1;

WLoi= 0 .4 ,

p=$0.2, and

e

=0.005, and that

production costs (Cprod) follows an N (35, 10) distribution, Cex^post~ N(7,2) and Cex.ante-3 ,
the following results were obtained after running 40,000 simulations.

It should be pointed out that in Scenario A, as a result of M SP’s superior power which,
according to the definition o f power, means better reputation and market position, the
weight o f Loss o f Image is considered the most followed by Financial Loss and
Incomplete Contract. On the other hand, as the EU is a relatively weak enterprise with
less reputation and worse market and economic position, Loss o f Partner is considered
the least significant element o f failure.
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Figure 23 shows the schematic presentation o f the simulation model for Scenario A.
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.
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Monte
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Carlo
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t
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P Failure
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Correlation

^
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Figure 23. Schematic view o f the simulation model for Scenario A

Also, the cost structure is similar to Scenario C, illustrated in Figure 17, except that
is replaced by

C PR.

C XRq

The results o f simulation runs using the sample distributions are

summarized in Table 14.
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Table 14. Simulation results for the sample problem o f Scenario A
M in im u m

M ean

Total C Pro(j

7.183

48.929

Total C ex-post

0.564

32.336

N am e

C total
% NPV
FLo
LoP
1C
Lol
F a ilu r e
P r o b a b ilit y

18.946
-132.676
0
0
0
0

M a x im u m
O u tp u ts
97.219
169.909

x1

P1

x2

p2

30.536

5%

67.479

95%

8.930

5%

107.667

95%
95%

84.265

234.118

51.045

5%

160.602

18.206
0.194
0.559

76.767
1

-54.758

5%
5%

4 7.223
1

5%
5%
5%

1
1
1

95%
95%
95%
95%
95%

1
1
1

0
0
0
0

1

0

5%

1

95%

18.360

5%

51.262

95%

0

0.274
0.336
0.300

C Prod

0.180

34.968

In p u ts
74.000

^ ex-post

0.002

6.998

15.059

3.703

5%

10.296

95%

"^Personnel

1.0

2.494

4

1

5%

4

95%

^Personnel

0

4.114

12.342

1.077

5%

7.313

95%

p

0

0.203

1

0

5%

1

95%

^tech

0.000

6.557

23.944

1.164

5%

12.738

95%

fe c h

1

2

4

1

5%

4

95%

7

95%

' underqualified

1

5

7

2

5%

0.000

3.290

11.558

0.597

5%

6 .375

95%

1

3

7

1

5%

6

95%

^productivity

1

4

7

3

5%

6

95%

^MSPopportunism
L+

1

5

7

2

5%

7

95%

3.172
1

5%
5%

15.321

95%
95%

11.530
2.949

5%

73.5114

5%

18.329

95%
95%

93.244

95%

^schedule
^-'schedule
Cprcductiv ity
(Low comitment)

^commitment
MRq
C-MRq

9.112
3

0.011
1
0.006
0.003

•

41.550
10.433

24.621
7
118.718
35.325

7

17.489

70.492

119.672

47.584

5%

^controversy

1

3

4

1

5%

4

95%

^EUHardship

1

3

4

1

5%

4

95%

C-cov erage

1

4

7

2

5%

6

95%

0.009

11.391

29.996

3.886

5%

19.026

95%

^lawsuits

CpR
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4.2.5 Analysis and Conclusions
As shown in the table, the probability o f failure is again high and is 30 percent.
Moreover, the probability o f loss o f partner, LoP, is also high and, on average, in 56% o f
the time, the EU will have less than 50% chance o f being able to continue doing business
with the MSP, mainly as a result o f having financial difficulties caused by M SP’s
opportunistic behavior and additional costs it imposes on the EU, denoted by L +.
The probability of financial loss is also relatively high and, on average, in approximately
19% o f the time, the contract does not result in the desired profit, at least 10%, even
though the MSP might be able to impose additional costs o f up to 25% o f the original
price on the EU. The probabilities o f incomplete contract and loss o f image are also
rather high, on average in 27 and 33 percent o f the time above 50%, respectively.

Table 15 provides interesting information about the number and percentage o f times
Level-2 risk factors are qualified which, in turn, can provide useful information on the
root causes o f these risk factors. For instance, the statistics show that only in 40% o f the
simulation runs L+ is not qualified, which means that there is a 60% chance that the MSP
ask for more money that what originally agreed on in the contract.
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Table 15. Qualification statistics o f Level-2 risk factors in Scenario A

V a r ia b le

D

underqualified
L+
M Rq
'

% of
No o f
tim e s n o t tim e s n o t
q u a lifie d q u a lifie d
21795

54.4875

15862
1199

39.655
2.9975

1199

2.9975

^lawsuits

35279

88.1975

^controversy

15862

39.655

t^EUHardship

15862

39.655

OviRq

D-cov erage

15779

39.4475

As mentioned before, loss o f image is the most important risk factor for the MSP in this
scenario, and the regression sensitivity analysis indicates that its main reason is “M SP’s
opportunistic behavior” and “Negative media coverage/word o f mouth”. The threat o f
M SP’s opportunistic behavior is further realized when it is identified as the first and most
important reason o f failure (Figure 24).
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I^MSPopportunism

D-coverage

^controversy

MRq

^EU H ardship

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Std b Coefficients

Figure 24. Regression Sensitivity Analysis for Loss o f image in Scenario A

According to the tornado graph in Figure 25, M SP’s opportunistic behavior, and high
production costs are the most influential Level-1 risk factors on the probability o f failure.
As mentioned before, both o f these risk factors can be practically controlled. In practice,
MSPs have begun to recognize the importance o f controlling opportunistic behavior and
in many sectors, such as, for example, electronics, successful MSPs seek collaborative,
long-term partnerships with their EUs [3]. In fact, a significant industry trend in recent
years has been moving from single contracts to partnerships and risk sharing
arrangements [20].
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DMSPopportunism

^controversy

D -coverage

MRq
Total Cprod

^EU H ardship

-1
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0
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0.6

0.8

1

Std b Coefficients

Figure 25. Regression Sensitivity Analysis for Failure Probability in Scenario A

If we assume that the M SP’s opportunistic behavior is controlled, for example in a highly
regulated environment or through long-term, collaborative arrangements, the probability
of failure is radically decreased. According to the two tornado graphs, Table 16 and
definition o f Std b, probability o f failure and loss of image can be reduced by
approximately 0.19 (0.520*0.357) and 0.23 (0.478* 0.473), respectively, if DMSPopportunhm
is decreased by one Std Dev, i.e. 1.756.

According to Figure 25, “high production costs”, denoted by Cprod, is the second most
influential Level-1 risk factor on the probability o f failure. Assuming that production
costs are substantially kept low, through for example taking full advantage o f modularity,
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standardization and reusability [1] or moving the production to low-wage areas, and
running the simulation again the probability o f failure can be cut down by 0.035
(0.357*0.098), for each 11.27 units decrease in production costs.

Table 16. Summary statistics for Scenario A
S ta tis tic

V a lu e fo r
F a ilu re
P ro b a b ility

V a lu e
fo r
LoP

Minimum

0

Maximum

V a lu e fo r

V a lu e f o r

Cprod

D|VISPopportunism

0

7.183

1

1

1

97.219

7

Mean

0.300

0.336

48.929

4.710

S td D ev

0.357

0.472

11.270

1.756

Variance

0.127

0.223

127.019

3.086

Skewness

0.862

0.693

0.0277

-0.461

Kurtosis

2.281

1.480

2.987

2.233

Median

0.100

0

48.845

5

Mode

0

0

31.431

5
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4.3 Scenario F
4.3.1 Description
Scenario F is the third riskiest scenario. In this case, similar to Scenario C, the balance o f
power is in favor o f the EU and unlike both scenarios A and C, the MSP provides the EU
with a standard, commodity service.

Similar to Scenario C, since the balance o f power is in favor o f the EU, all managerial
categories o f uncertainties, i.e. uncertainty in time, in information, and in control[7], are
significant and have to be considered. Thus, risk factors associated with this scenario are
also less likely to be controllable.

In electronics, most o f the arrangements Contract Manufacturers (CM) or Electronics
Manufacturing Services (EMS) (which CMs have evolved to) are involved in can be
categorized under this category. There are several rival large CM or EMS companies who
all offer a more or less similar set o f manufacturing services to Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEM) which are mostly well-established market players with strong
market position and brand names (companies such as, for example, HP, Microsoft and
Cisco). Their business is often a risky, low margin business which is always potentially
threatened by new disruptive technologies.

4.3.2 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the System
Step 1_ Level-3 risk factors
Already completed in 3.5.1.

79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Step 2_ Level-1 risk factors
Since in Scenario F, similar to Scenario C, the balance o f power is favor o f the EU, all
risk factors resulted from the power structure, which were modeled for Scenario C, are
applicable here as well and, therefore, are not repeated in this section.

On the other hand, the fact that the service provided by the MSP is not a specific service
and can be considered a mature commodity service which can be also provided by many
other MSPs dictates other risk factors as illustrated in Figure 26.

E xcessive schedule pressure
Financial pressure
Creeping requirements
Competitors’ low er price

Competitors’
more utility
Competitors’ better quality

Level-1 risk factors
Service attributes

Disruptive technology

Com m odity Service
Mature Service
Leads to

-------►

L evel-1 rsik factor

Figure 26. Level-1 risk factors resulted from service attributes in Scenario F

16

A disruptive technology or disruptive innovation, an expression coined by Clayton M.
Christensen and used in contrast with sustaining technology or innovation, is “a

A com m odity service is a non-com plex, w hich is n o t v ery asset specific o r tim e sensitive.
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technological innovation, product, or service that eventually overturns the existing
dominant technology or status quo product in the market.” It dominates an existing
market by either filling a role in a new market that the older technology could not fill (for
example more expensive, lower capacity but smaller-sized hard disks used in newly
developed notebook computers in the 1980s) or by successively performance until finally
replacing the older technology (as digital photography has begun to replace film
photography) [22].
The impacts o f the identified Level-1 risk factors are listed in Table 17.
Table 17. Impacts o f Level-1 risk factors o f Scenario F
R isk Factor

Effects

Competitors’ better quality

• EU’s financial pressure

Competitors’ lower price

• EU’s creeping requirements[7]

Competitors’ more utility
Disruptive technology
EU’s opportunistic behavior

EU’s new expectations asking for new
technology
Time and cost pressure, creeping requirements
[7], overdependence on the EU

Step 3_ Level-2 risk factors

Level-1 risk factors, if actualized, give rise to the second level o f risk factors, which can
directly cause the MSP to fail.
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H Law suits
Cost overrun

Controversial relationship
Level-2risk factors
Level-1 risk factors

Financial pressure
Excessive schedule pressure
Low productivity
leads to

Disruptive technology

Level-1 risk factor
Creeping requirements

Level-2 risk factor □

Figure 27. Level-2 risk factors o f Scenario F

Even though the identified Level-2 risk factors in Scenario F are similar to the ones
identified in Scenario C and, therefore, they will have the same effects (Table 3), the risk
factors associated with each scenario should be quantified and modeled differently since
they are rooted in different sources.

Figure 28 represents the relationship between Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors and how
realization o f Level-2 risk factors can cause the MSP to fail in its contractual relationship
with the EU.
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Figure 28. Level-2 and Level-3 Risk factors in Scenario F

4.3.3 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
Level-1 risk factors

In this section, we explain the way Level-1 risk factors are quantified. Considering the
impacts and implications of each risk factor a number o f random variables are defined to
quantify each risk factor. Also, an example distribution is considered for each random
variable to be used in the example simulation runs. Again the risk factors already
modeled for Scenario C are omitted to avoid redundancy.

• Disruptive technology
• Disruptive Technology occurrence (DisTech where PDisTech= PoisTech)
In the example, PoisTech is considered equal to 0.01.

• Competitors’ lower price
• Competitors’ price (PCOmp~f (Pcomp))
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In the e x am p le,/ ( P COmp) is set to Normal (100,10), which implies that the average price
of the competitors is the same as your leasing price.

• Competitors’ better quality
• Competitors’ quality ( Q COm p ~ 1 to7 scale17)
In the example, it is assumed that

Q COmp

follows a Binomial (6, 0.5, shift(l))

distribution.

• Competitors’ more utility
• Competitors’ lead-time (LTcomp~ 1 to7 scale)
• Competitors’ peripheral services (PScomp~ 1 to7 scale)
In the example, it is assumed that both LTcomp and PScomp follow a Binomial (6, 0.5,
shift(l)) distribution.

• EU’s opportunistic behavior
• Degree o f EU ’s opportunism (.D EuoPPortunism~ 1 to 7 scale)

Note that as EU has superior power, the probabilities o f higher degrees o f opportunism
are considered to be greater.

D schedule

is positively correlated with D opportmjsm since the EU

can pressurize the MSP to complete what is committed to do in shorter time. In the
example, P (D EuoPPortunism ={1,2,3,4,5,6,7}) = {0.05,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.23,0.22,0.2}).

• Creeping requirements
• Costs o f extra requirements (CxRq ~ f (CxRq)) (added to production costs and is

17 The com parative 1 to 7 scale is defined as follows:
1: m uch w orse, 2: w orse, 3: rather w orse, 4: sam e, 5: rather better, 6: better, 7: m uch better

84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

qualified if DisTech 1 or D o p p o r tu n is m ^ ^ or Q c o m p '>4 or P S c o m p '>4.)

M

if DisTech=\

CxRq-*

(19)
Otherwise

~ f (CxRq)

where M is a large number. This ensures that if a disruptive technology comes around,
assuming that the MSP will not be able to offer that immediately, it certainly will not be
able to provide the EU with its new requirements.

CxRq, in the absence o f disruptive technology, qualifies MRq if it is greater than CxRqAlso, CxRq is strongly correlated with MRq,

Q COm p

and

P S comp

and is added to production

costs. In the numerical example,/(C x p f is assumed to be exponential 15) and CxRg=0.

• Financial pressure
• The imposed price cut on the MSP (L~), defined as a percentage o f original L,
leasing price stated in the original contract, defined as follows:
r
''flfa

)

if

D EUopportunism?* 4 OR P comp

* '8 5

L 'H

(20)
^ ~ /(X )

Otherwise

Obviously, the mean o f f ( L ) is greater than the mean o f /( X ). In the example, f ( L )
a n d /( X ) are considered as Normal(10, 5) and Normal(5,2), respectively. X" has strong
negative correlation with P

COm p

■CxRq and X are qualified if D

E uopportunism >
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4.

• Excessive schedule pressure [7]
• Degree o f schedule pressure (DSCheduie ~1 to 7 scale).
EUopportunism,<

ffl (Dschedule )

4 AND

L T comp
cnmn< 5

(21)
Otherwise

J 2 ( D s c h e d u le )

• Total % cost to make up schedule pressure which MSP incurs if Dscheduie >4
{.Cschedule ~ . / ( C sch ed u le))

These two random variables are positively correlated; Dscheduie is also positively correlated
with

L T comp

and

CxRq.

In the example, we consider f i ( D
and

shift(l))

distribution

V ( D s c h e d u ie =

{ 1 ,2,3,4,5,6,7 }) = {0.05,0.1 ,0.1,0. 1 5,0.25,0.2,0.15 }.

f 2 (DSCheduie)

as

a

SCheduie )

discrete

as a binomial (6, 0.5,
distribution

where

• Qcheduie- N orm al(2,1)

Defining Dscheduie as described above, insures higher probabilities for actualization o f
excessive schedule pressure in case the EU behaves opportunistically or the competitors
provide the same service with shorter lead times.

• Low Productivity[7][10]
• Degree o f productivity {Dproductivity)- 1 to 7 scale
Dproductivity

has strong negative correlation with D scheduie,

C XRq

and L

\ D EUopportunism.

In the

example, we consider that D productivity follows a binomial (6, 0.5, shift(l)) distribution.
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The rest o f the model is similar to that o f Scenario C, except the following differences:
• Missing requirements
• % o f requirements missed (MRq)
f 100

if DisTech=l

MRq =■

(22)
-f (MRq)

Otherwise

• Costs o f missing requirements (CMRq ~ f (CMRq )) (added to ex post transaction
costs)
' 0

if DisTech=l or MRq=0

CMRq =-(

(23)
^

~ f ( C MRq)

Otherwise

In the absence o f disruptive technology, these two random variables are strongly
correlated with each other, D opportunism, Dscheduie and XRq.

• Law suits
• Additional court costs (Clawsuits) (added to ex post transaction costs)
f
Clawsuits

^(Cla w su its)

if 22c o n tro v e rsy 4 Or (IVlRq ^ \4Rq\ and l^ 'is lcch 0)

<

(24)

^0

Otherwise

Ciawsuit is strongly correlated with MRq and f (Clawsuits) is considered Normal (70, 20) in
the example.
Moreover, as invention o f a disruptive technology is a radical change that can potentially
change all the equations, we need to change some o f the w multipliers as follows:
0

if D isTech-\

Controversy
LoP
=<

(25)
0.1

Otherwise
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ri

LoP

i f D isT ech = \

=-<

(26)
0.5

Otherwise

if DisTech=\
. LawSuits

w.LoP

(27)
0.4

Otherwise

if DisTech=\
...LawSuits

w,L ol

(28)
0.4

Otherwise

if DisTech= 1
, J Controversy
Lol

(29)

=<

0.1

r i
MRq
Lol

=

Otherwise

if DisTech- 1

i

(30)
0.5

Otherwise

Different formulations in the case o f disruptive technology ensure that in case o f
disruptive technology, the short term interests o f the MSP with regard to the contract
under study (profit margin and completing the contract) are not endangered as much as
its long-term benefits (continuing business with the EU and keeping its image and
market share). This is especially important since we have assumed that time horizon o f
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the contract is short.

Thus, since disruptive technology is such a radical change that requires a different
model, two different models are simulated in parallel to reflect what is likely to happen
in reality. One model assesses the probability o f success if the dominance o f the current
technology offered by the MSP remains untouched during the time horizon o f the
contract, and the other one attempts to assess M SP’s chances o f success in case a
disruptive technology gains dominance in this period. Simulating these two models as
the two states the system may have with different probabilities allows for a more realistic
risk assessment process.

Similar to Scenario C, the probabilities o f Level-3 risk factors are calculated as follows:
, A,LawSuits * ryLawSuits _±_ „, controversy & jjcontroversy j_ , t MRq * jyM Rq
nr>c = w
IC
* PIC + w,c
* p [C
+ wIC * pic
7-)

LawSuits

r lop - wLoP* iJLoF
7-)__ _ „,

F l o i-

w

LawSuits
LoI

*

d

LawSuits ,

+ wLoP

a

r \ LawSuits
*PL
oI

,

,,

Controversy

+ w LoI

Controversy

* p LoP

& -[^Controversy

+ wLoP

* r>Controversy

PLoI

_ i_

+

_t MRq
wL
oI

*

,

„,

(31)

MRq

*

jyM Rq

ryMRq
PL
n[

(33)

Also, we consider the following values for the model parameters:
e=$5;

PIC= PLoP= PLoI =0.5;

MRql=50;

M Rql =20;

w“

(32)

'f t=0.5;

wfcRq= 0.2andM =100.
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4.3.4 Propagating the Uncertainties
40,000 simulations were run assuming that

W f/jO= 0 .3 ; W jc = 0 .1 5 ; WLof = 0 .4 ; Wil0f= 0.15,

p=$0.5 [11], e =0.005, Cex.ante=8, and that production costs (Cprod) follows an N(25, 5)
distribution and Cex.post~H {l,4)Figure 29 shows the schematic presentation o f the simulation model. The cost structure is
also the same as that o f Scenario C.

EUopporlunism

Level-1
Monte

comp

comp

PSc1comp

Carlo
samples

\DisTec
-...... -yj......

Level-2
Monte
—| isc o n tro versy

Carlo
samples
Level-3
Monte
Carlo

Lol

LoP

JC

samples
■ T fc

▼

A-

Cost item
Correlation

^

Qualification -A------

Figure 29. Schematic view o f Scenario F simulation model
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Since the contracted service is a commodity service, production costs are considered less
than the other two scenarios. Also, the main objective o f the MSP is considered satisfying
the EU so that it continues leasing M SP’s services and does not switch to other similar
MSPs. This is the reason why Wfj0p is considered the greatest o f other weights, which are
assumed to be o f equal importance.

Table 18 represents the results o f simulating the developed model for Scenario F, using
the sample distributions.
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Table 18. Simulation results for Scenario F numeric example
xi

P1

x2

P2

21.272

5%

75.360

95%

194.870

5.303

5%

108.575

95%

71.858

290.839

33.831

5%

158.709

95%

1C

-262.569
0
0
0

14.426
0.219
0.283
0.118

0

0.283

-80.776
0
0
0
0

5%
5%
5%
5%
5%

51.833
1
1
1

Lol

66.916
1
1
1
1

1

95%
95%
95%
95%
95%

F a ilu re
P r o b a b ility

0

0.239

1

0

5%

1

95%

N am e

M in im u m

M ean

Total C p rod

7.558

4 1.075

O u tp u ts
142.931

Total C ex-post

0.002

27.783

14.967

C MSP
% NPV

FLo
LoP

M a x im u m

In p u ts
5% 33.26075 95%

C Prod

4.416

25.024

44.822

16.814

^ ex-post

0.001
0

7.352
0.0107

22.662
1

1.601
0

5%
5%

0

95%

59.055

100.026

147.508

83.383

5%

116.538

95%

Q com p

1

4

7

2

5%

6

95%

t-TCOm p

1

4

7

2

5%

6

95%

P
1 's
°c o m p

1

4

7

2

5%

6

95%

^schedule

1.000

4

7

2

5%

5

95%

^schedule

1

5

7

2

5%

7

95%

^schedule

0.004

2.204

6.25 7

0.697

5%

3.788

95%

^productivity

1

4

7

2

5%

6

95%

^EUopportunism

1

5

7

2

5%

7

95%

L-i

0.002

5.106

12.925

1.960

5%

8.253

95%

t-"2

0.017

11.382

2 9.328

3.671

5%

19.398

95%

^XRq

0 .0 0 0

16.721

99.361

1.297

5%

46.825

95%

M Rq

0.038

21.106

58.444

5.946

5%

36.904

95%

OviRq

0.002

12.004

47.222

2.045

5%

23.912

95%

^lawsuits

5.290

82.764

156.334

49.640

5%

115.262

95%

1

3

4

1

5%

4

95%

D isTech
P
'

comp

^controversy

13.67758 95%

4.3.5 Analysis and Conclusions
The simulation results (Table 18) indicate that there is an approximately 22% chance that
the contract bring in no financial profit and there is 24% chance o f failure. Also, there is a
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28% chance that the EU switches to other similar MSPs, with the probability o f 50%,
after completing this contract.

Table 19 contains useful information on the number and percentage o f times Level-2 risk
factors are not qualified and can provide useful information on the root causes o f these
risk factors. For instance, the statistics show that only in 17% o f the simulation runs extra
requirements in addition to what mentioned in the original contract are not imposed on
the MSP (creeping requirements). Also, there is only 11% chance that there are no
missing requirements.

Table 19. Level-2 risk factors qualification statistics in Scenario A

V a r ia b le

No o f
% of
tim e s n o t tim e s n o t
q u a lifie d q u a lifie d

CxRq

7124

17.81

MRq

4501

11.2525

^MRq

4501

11.2525

35274

88.185

5449

13.6225

^lawsuits
Dqontrov ersy

Figure 30 illustrates the results o f performing regression sensitivity analysis on “Loss o f
Partner”.
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^controversy

0.474

MRq
0.423

D isTech
0.168
EUopportunism

0.101

CXRq

-0.048

teomp

0.043

p s'comp
,

0.04

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Std b Coefficients
Figure 30. Regression Sensitivity analysis for Loss o f Partner in Scenario F

As expected, one o f the main reasons for losing the EU is that the MSP will not be able to
meet all EU’s short-term and long-term requirements. Given that we can trace back
missing requirements to

M SP’s competition,

disruptive technology

and

EU ’s

opportunistic behavior, and that “controversial relationship” is also rooted in

EU ’s

opportunistic behavior, it can be concluded that EU’s Opportunistic behavior amplified
by M SP’s competitors and emergence o f a disruptive technology are the most significant
reasons for loss o f partner. In fact, these two risk factors are also the main reasons o f
M SP’s failure (Figure 31).
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'controversy

0.577

MRq

0.316

D isTech

0.195

EUopportunism

0.123

'XRq

0.094

•comp

0.064

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Std b Coefficients

Figure 31. Regression Sensitivity analysis for Failure Probability in Scenario F

The analysis shows that the risk factors associated with Scenario F are the least
controllable o f the three scenarios. Figure 31 shows that even high production costs,
Cpmd, is not a major reason for failure. However, it should be kept substantially low in
order to to stay competitive and to keep M SP’s services attractive to the EUs.
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HAPTER

C

5 Conclusions and
Recommendations

5.1 Comparison o f Scenarios
In this section the simulation results o f the three scenarios are compared and analyzed.
Even though the numerical examples are based on made up data, the distributions used in
the simulations are designed in a way to be reasonably realistic. Table 20 summarizes the
distributions used in the simulated numerical example; the random variables common
between more than one scenario are shaded to be distinguishable.

Table 20. Distributions used in scenarios
^ \S c e n a rio
V a r ia b le ^ \.

c

A

■>

6 . \ -Mill

5

Cex-post

N( 10,4)

N(7.2)

N(40,15)

N(35.10)

Binomial(3, 0.5,

Binomial(3. 0.5,

Shi 11(1))

Shi 11(1))

X(5, 2)

N(4.2)

0.1

0.3

l3inomial(3, 0.5.

Binomial(3, 0.5.

Shift(l))

Shift(l))

N(8, 5)

N(6,4)

C prod
T personnel

(-^Personnel

^underqualified

('tech

F

lliiiS iiS iiiiH

|
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e

1 5 )

. 1 0 )

( 1 0 , 8 )

( 7 5 . 2 0 )

i n o m

S h i t t ( l ) )

0

&
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x p o n e n i i a l t

( 4 0 . 2 0 )
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0 . 5 .

(

W

1

( 3 0 . 2 0 )

' . i 1 . 2 2 . 0 . 2 ;

Hl-.Vnpiwrtunism

(

(

2

i a l ( 3 ,

S h i l ' t ( l ) )

0 . 5 .

O

^ " \S c e n a r io
V a r ia b le ^ \.

c

A

F

P({1,2,3,4,5,6,7})=

DMSPopportunism

{0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.
22,0.2,0.18}
L+

N(8,4)
P({1,2,3,4,5,6,7})=

Dcommitment

{0.18,0.2,0.22,0.15,
0.1,0.1,0.05}
Binomial(3, 0.5,

DEUHardship

Shift(l))
Binomial(6, 0.5,

P -coverage

Shift(l))
N(10,5)

CpR

0.01

PoisTech

Pcomp

N(100,10)

Qcomp

Binomial(6, 0.5,
Shift(l))
Binomial(6, 0.5,

LTcomp

Shift(l))
Binomial(6, 0.5,

PScomp

Shift(l))

For instance, it is assumed that Cproci has the smallest mean and standard deviation in
Scenario F since the manufacturing service contracted in this scenario involves low
degrees o f asset specificity, and, therefore, requires less investment and enjoys higher
economy scales and salvage value for the manufacturing facilities. This is also due to the
fact that the manufacturing service in this scenario is a commodity, mature service.
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However,

C p ro d

is not considered too low since the leasing price o f the service, L, cannot

be too high because o f the competitive market and because the EU is in a better
bargaining position.

The simulation results are consistent with the hypothesis mentioned in [14], and the
probability o f failure in Scenario C is the most, followed closely by Scenario A, and
lastly Scenario F. Table 21 summarizes the summary o f results obtained from simulating
the numerical examples o f the three scenarios.

Table 21. Three Scenarios results summary
Scenario
C

A

F

32%

30%

24%

EU’s opportunistic

MSP’s

EU’s opportunistic

behaviour

opportunistic

behaviour

O u tput
Probability o f failure
Main failure root cause

behaviour
Most influential risk
factor

Controversial

MSP’s

Controversial

relationship

opportunistic

relationship

behaviour

Interestingly, in all the three scenarios, even in scenarios C and A, where the
manufacturing service contracted is a highly specific one, the most influential risk factor
is not high production costs but it is the opportunistic behavior o f the more powerful
party. The potential long-term and short-term threats o f controversial relationships
resulting from one party’s opportunistic behavior, shirking, and pressuring are widely
known and many pieces o f research are focused on finding ways to manage and control
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these risk factors (e.g. [3][6][8]). This is also consistent with current industry trends in
sourcing arrangements which is moving towards partnerships and joint ventures to set off
the effects o f lack o f balance and help both partners benefit equally from the contract
(e.g. [3] [20][34][ 14]).

5.2 Recommendations and Future Research
The main limitation o f this research is probably the fact the simulations rely on arbitrary
data. To overcome this and to further streamline this research, the following can be done:
•

Evaluating the real performance o f the model through applying on real-life data

•

Completing the model to incorporate internal risk factors as well as external ones

•

Using agent-based modeling to simulate Scenario F which is highly influenced by
the behaviour o f autonomous competitors

•

Developing a comprehensive risk assessment model which simultaneously
considers both actors and studied the risk factors threatening the probability o f a
win-win contract which benefits both parties in long-term

•

Completing the definition o f failure by incorporating other Level-3 risk factors,
such as loss o f intellectual property
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APPENDIX A
Rank Order Correlation
The rank order coefficient was developed by Spearman in early 1900’s. It is calculated
based on the rankings o f values, i.e. their position within the min-max range o f their
possible values, without making any assumptions about the distribution o f the variables,
and not the actual values themselves[29]. The rank order coefficient, usually denoted by
p, is a number between -1 and +1, where -1 means a perfect negative correlation, 1
indicates a perfect positive correlation and a p value between -0.5 and 0.5 indicates a
week correlation [35].
@RISK allows for creating rank order correlation matrices using its RISKCORRMAT
function. It generates rank-correlated pairs o f sampled values in a two step process prior
to simulation, as follows:
1. It generates a set o f randomly distributed "rank scores" for each variable. For
example, if n iterations are to be run, n scores are generated for each variable. In fact,
rank scores are simply values o f varying magnitude between a minimum and
maximum. These rank scores are then rearranged to give pairs o f scores which
generate the desired rank correlation coefficient. In each simulation run, there is a
pair o f scores, one score for each variable.
2. It generates a set o f random numbers (between 0 and 1) to be used in for each
variable. A gain , i f there are n sim ulation runs, n random num bers are generated for

each variable. These random numbers are then ranked in increasing order. For each
variable, the smallest random number is then used in the iteration with the smallest
rank score, the second smallest random number is used in the iteration with the
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second smallest rank score and so on. This ordering based on ranking continues for
all random numbers until the largest random number is used with the largest rank
score.
The result o f this procedure is a set o f paired random numbers that can be used in
sampling values from the correlated distributions in each iteration o f the simulation[29].
When setting up a correlation matrix, it is very important to make sure that the resulting
matrix is not invalid and is self-consistent. An invalid matrix involves inconsistent
simultaneous relationships between three or more inputs. For instance, if input A and B
are correlated with a coefficient o f +1, B and C with a coefficient o f +1, and C and A
with a coefficient o f -1, the resulting correlation matrix will be oclearly invalid[29].
@RISK can correct any invalid matrix and generate the closest valid matrix to the
entered invalid one.
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